Next week will see the resumption of military to military talks between the U.S and China.  Coming in the wake of the U.S.– China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, what can we expect from this exchange?

Since the last such talks in 2009, China’s domestic and foreign posture has become more assertive.  Domestically, the Chinese government has cracked down on dissidents with renewed vigour, most notably in the sentencing of Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner, for subverting state power, and the recent detainment of the artist Ai Weiwei, ostensibly related to as yet undetailed financial crimes.  In addition, the recent inchoate online calls for a Jasmine Revolution to mirror the current turmoil in theMiddle East has spooked the CCP who fear any example of resistance to authoritarian government.

China’s foreign policy has also displayed a harsher edge.  While for some time Beijing’s diplomacy won some prestige and plaudits through its involvement with the Six Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, from 2009 China began to consciously lean toward Pyonyang.  When North Korea sank the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, the Chinese refrained from criticising North Korea, alienating Seoul.  This state of affairs was only exacerbated by Beijing’s muted response to the DPRK’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.

This has had the twin consequences of pushing South Korea closer to the United States and, surprisingly, given Seoul’s historical grievances against Japan, has even led South Korea to investigate the possibility of a military pact with Tokyo.

Japan was also taken aback by the Chinese response to its arrest of a Chinese trawler captain whose vessel rammed a Japanese patrol boat.  Although Japan ultimately repatriated the fisherman, China’s aggressive reaction – holding up the export of rare earth minerals, demanding an apology and detaining Japanese citizens resident in China in an apparent retaliatory gesture – concentrated Japan’s mind on the possible future threat represented by China.  Such thoughts are not reassured by the continued presence of Chinese submarines in Japanese waters nor by the buzzing of a Japanese destroyer by a Chinese military helicopter off Okinawa in March.

The Philippines has also complained about the treatment one of its survey vessels received in the resource-rich South China Sea.  According to Manila, Chinese patrol ships threatened to ram the survey ship.  Vietnamese fishing boats have also been harassed by Chinese vessels.

The issue of China’s maritime actions came to a head in the summer of 2010 when the PLA claimed “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea, albeit with the caveat that it would allow others to freely navigate these waters.  The suggestion that the Chinese consider the South China Sea a core interest was of considerable concern to others who claim territory in these waters.  The Vietnamese, for example, continue to claim ownership of the Paracel Island Chain, from which China evicted them in 1974.  They also differ on ownership of the Spratly Islands, while countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei also claim ownership over parts of the sea.

Finally, the Chinese also chose to unveil and test its J-20 fighter jet during the visit of U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates.

The reasons behind this new assertiveness are unclear, but it seems probable that it is the result of a number of factors, such as poor co-ordination between Chinese bureaucracies, a lack of control at the very top allied to the sense, particularly in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and the relative decline of the West vis-à-vis China, that now Beijing is strong enough to adopt a more assertive and aggressive foreign policy.

The U.S. for its part has also been active.  In 2009, Vietnamese officials were invited to visit an American aircraft carrier, the USS John C. Stennis in an apparent attempt to continue to build links withVietnam as a hedge against China.

July 2010 saw U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton give a speech at the ASEAN meeting in Hanoi in which she emphasised that Washington considered any territorial disputes in the region to have global implications because of its role as a trade route and source of natural resources.  She particularly irked Beijing by suggesting that the U.S.could act as an arbiter in any such regional disputes, offering support for smaller South East Asian states anxious about the prospect of bilateral disputes with Beijing. China’s Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, was particularly riled by this, stating that Clinton’s words were “an attack on China” and adding, in conversation with George Yeo, the erstwhile Singaporean Foreign Affairs Minister, that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact”.  Such remarks further alienated China’s neighbours.

Clinton followed this trip with an October tour of a number of countries around the Asia Pacific, including China, aimed at re-affirming Washington’s commitment to the region.

This, then, is the background to the resumption of talks.  While both sides are unhappy at the actions of the other, they realise that they have common interests and that their relationship is too important to neglect.  As American power declines relative to that of the Chinese, such talks will become increasingly important.  Small and middle power countries in the region will look on with interest and hope that American engagement in the region will restrain the Chinese. Beijing may look at the resumption of these talks as a way to begin to undo the suspicion that its clumsy diplomacy of the last couple of years has created amongst its neighbours. Beijing is still keen to promulgate its narrative of a harmonious rise that promises no ill to its neighbours or the wider world.  While it is unlikely that these talks will result in any radical outcomes, it is to be hoped that their resumption will lead to further development and maturation of the most important bilateral relationship in the world.