A recent report has suggested that Japan may sell submarine technology or even, in what would represent a sea change in Tokyo’s defence policy, an entire fleet of vessels to Australia.  Canberra is currently considering how to replace its existing Collins class submarine and has expressed an interest in acquiring Japanese submarine technology in recent years.  If such a transfer takes places, both countries would reap some benefits.  However, it may place Canberra in an awkward position in the future should, as has been reported, Tokyo insist on some kind of formal alliance in order to seal the deal.

Firstly, from a financial perspective, a Japanese decision to sell Soryu class boats to Australia would provide a boost to its manufacturers, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation.  Additional orders would also drive down the manufacturing cost, meaning that Tokyo and Canberra would have to shell out less cash to purchase future boats.

Australia would also benefit by acquiring a boat in all likelihood superior to anything that it could independently design and construct. The problems surrounding the Collins class submarine offers plentiful evidence of the challenges associated with designing and building such a complex piece of equipment.

Canberra’s attraction to the Soryu is therefore understandable.  It would obtain a proven, capable platform for substantially less than it would cost to construct an indigenously designed replacement for the Collins.  Better and cheaper?  It should be a no brainer.

From a strategic perspective, however, the decision is not so clear cut.  Reports suggest Tokyo would insist on some kind of formal alliance arrangement.  This is not unreasonable.  Both Japan and Australia are liberal democracies, share a strong economic relationship and enjoy extensive people-to-people ties.  However, though shared values may make an alliance easier to sustain, alliances are rarely founded on them.

What really matters are interests.  Australia, for example, is not straining to ally with Sweden; despite the many values both countries share, they have few common pressing interests.  In contrast, after Nixon went to China, Washington and Beijing developed a quasi-alliance, not because they shared common values, but because they had a common interest in containing the Soviet Union.

When we consider Tokyo and Canberra’s interests, the picture is a little murkier.  As Chinese power grows, Japan is casting around for all the friends it can find.  This is at the root of Shinzo Abe’s desire to strengthen Tokyo’s alliance with the U.S., loosen Japan’s constitutional restriction on the use of force, and cultivate ties with countries such as India, Vietnam, the Philippines and Australia.

This is clearly in Japan’s interests, but less clearly in Australia’s interests.  Before formally allying with Japan, Canberra should consider the possible consequences.  China and Japan are currently engaged in escalating competition in the East China Sea as they jockey for position around the Senkaku (Diaoyu to the Chinese) Islands.  While war is not imminent, it would be foolish to assume that it is impossible.  It is all too easy to envisage a scenario in which a rash decision made by a commander on the scene could lead to a clash that neither side wants but from which both may find it difficult to step back.

Should the worst happen, Japan would look to its allies for support and would expect them to honour their commitments.  If Australia was in a formal alliance with Japan, this would place Canberra in an extremely difficult decision.  Would it decide to contribute to military efforts directed against China, or would it disown its alliance with Japan?

This situation is not particularly likely, at least in the short term, but it illustrates the calculations that must be made before entering into such an arrangement with Tokyo.  Of course, Australian policymakers may decide that a decision to move closer to Japan may contribute toward deterring Beijing from upping the ante in the East China Sea.  Canberra certainly has an interest in maintaining the status quo in Asia and has no desire to see Beijing redraw maritime borders by the use, or threatened use, of force.

It is likely, however, that by moving closer to Japan, Canberra would exacerbate Beijing’s fear of containment, perhaps encouraging greater Chinese assertiveness in the future.  The Soryu would certainly boost Australia’s military capability, but any decision to acquire it must take into account the risk of getting dragged into conflicts Canberra may prefer to avoid and whether closer ties with Japan would serve Australia’s greater interest in helping to peacefully integrate China into the existing regional order.