Japan’s cabinet has approved a reinterpretation of its constitutional restrictions on its use of armed force.  The new interpretation has cleared the way – pending parliamentary ratification – for collective self-defence, the use of force to defend not only Japan but its allies.

It’s important to note, however, that some significant caveats will remain attached to Japan’s interpretation of collective defence.  Firstly, any attack on an allied country must clearly endanger Japan’s survival or severely impinge upon Japanese citizens’ lives, liberty and pursuit of happiness.  Secondly, the use of force must be the only way to repel the attack on Japan’s ally and protect Japanese citizens.  Thirdly, any use of force must be limited to the minimum required level.

While such caveats certainly offer room for manoeuvre, this reform is not evidence of the Japanese remilitarisation that Beijing and Seoul often identify in the most routine of Japanese military decisions.

Nevertheless, the move has not been without controversy.  One man set himself alight in Tokyo in protest while others have protested more soberly.  Abroad, China has, predictably, expressed outrage while South Korea has also expressed concern.

This reform, however, is a fillip for the U.S. which has long encouraged Japan to play a greater security role in its region.  Countries such as Australia also stand to benefit from a more normal Japanese defence posture.  Canberra is interested in acquiring Japanese submarine technology, or even completed submarines.

It’s difficult to emphasise how symbolically important Tokyo’s decision is.  In the wake of the Second World War, Japan adopted the Yoshida Doctrine, named after its formidable postwar Premier, Yoshida Shigeru.  This approach, which has remained hugely influential, demands that Japan focus on economic development while maintaining the relatively lightweight Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF).  To ensure its security, Japan has accommodated a substantial U.S. military presence.

While some in Washington accused Tokyo of free-riding throughout the Cold War, Japan’s grand strategy was undoubtedly successful.  In the early postwar years it was feared by it neighbours, despite its impoverished circumstances.  The doctrine guided Japan through a difficult period, enriching it and nurturing its status as a solid global citizen.  Why, then, has Tokyo decided to modify its stance?

The primary reason is China.  Beijing’s impressive military modernisation, combined with its increasing willingness to assert its expansive maritime claims, has focused minds in Tokyo.  By permitting the JSDF to come to the aid of its allies, even in the absence of a direct attack on Japan, Tokyo has changed Beijing’s strategic calculus and signalled its intent to balance against China.

Tokyo’s decision also hints at its doubts about Washington’s ability to maintain its primacy in Asia.  Though the U.S. will remain the strongest power in Asia for some time, Beijing is closing the gap at an impressive rate.  China will probably never be able to establish Chinese primacy in Asia, but its ability to contest American primacy is growing.  By freeing the JSDF to come to the aid of its allies, Tokyo is supporting the U.S. primacy that has guaranteed Japanese security for decades.

Domestic politics has also played a role in this decision.  Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has driven this reinterpretation which reflects his own nationalist views.  It is easily reconciled with his desire for Japan to be a normal nation, proud of its history and able to unashamedly wield all instruments of statecraft commensurate with its economic power.

While this reinterpretation won’t change Asia’s strategic environment in the short-term, it is a significant event illustrating the danger of security dilemmas in Asia.  As Beijing has increased its military strength, inculcated anti-Japanese nationalism as a way to legitimise the Communist Party’s continued rule, and sought to expand its maritime borders in an attempt to increase its internal and external security, it has made Japan feel less secure.

This has led to Tokyo’s decision to reinterpret its constitutional restrictions on the use of force, a decision which is likely to make Beijing feel less secure and seek to increase its efforts to maximise its security.  Such a course of action will only make Japan feel even less secure, causing it to seek to increase its security, and so on.  It’s a dangerous dynamic and is likely to lead to a less stable Asia.

It’s important to note that war is not inevitable, or even particularly likely, at least in the immediate future.  The problem is that when nations begin to view their relationship in zero-sum terms, it’s difficult to step back and seek mutually beneficial compromises.  Nobody wants to have their restraint misinterpreted as weakness.

Ideally, all parties would acknowledge the concerns of others and seek to ameliorate them.  Beijing (and Seoul) should acknowledge that since 1945 Japan has been a model international citizen, instrumental in their development.  They should admit that Japan is not about to go on a rampage across Asia and has a right to provide both for its own security and the security of its allies.  Beijing should also recognise that its rapid military modernisation, opaque intentions and increasing assertiveness lead its neighbours to fear the worst about its long-term trajectory.

Tokyo, meanwhile, ought to acknowledge the impact that visits by its senior leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine have on public opinion in China and South Korea and refrain from attending.  It should also cease to equivocate on its wartime atrocities, particularly its use of Korean ‘comfort women’.

Unfortunately, as Asia tranforms from a region characterised by U.S. primacy to one in which balancing behaviour is increasingly open, recognising the legitimate grievances and rights of other parties seems to be becoming ever more difficult.