Author Archives: Asia Pacific Briefing

President Ma Wins Second Term

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It is hard to over-state the importance of Saturday’s presidential election in Taiwan.  Three candidates – Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen and James Soong – competed for the right to lead a country whose small population of 23 million people belies its geopolitical importance.

The incumbent president, Ma Ying-jeou, has defeated his DPP rival, Tsai Ing-wen, who has resigned in the wake of defeat.  James Soong, a former senior member of the KMT who some though might siphon votes from Ma failed to make an impact, polling low single figures.

What, then, are the implications of Ma’s second term for Taiwan and the region?

For Taiwan, it gives Ma a mandate to continue to improve links with China.  Nevertheless, how Ma tackles Taiwan’s stuttering economy will surely play a large role in how his second term is assessed. He will hope that increased tourism from the mainland and deals signed with Beijing to lower tariffs on Taiwanese goods will stimulateTaipei’s economy.

He will also seek a peace treaty with the mainland and the removal of PLA missiles currently targeting the island.

Washington, too, will be quietly happy with the result.  While the DPP had moderated its pro-independence message, the U.S.is much more comfortable with Ma’s approach which has emphasised building ties with the mainland under his Three Nos policy – no declaration of independence, no unification, and no use of force to resolve the differences across the Straits.

Beijing will also see this result as a vindication of its policy toward Ma’s Taiwan.  To encourage engagement, China has signed trade deals advantageous to Taiwan, has allowed it to commence participation in several international bodies and has refrained from encouraging the few states that still recognise Taiwan diplomatically to switch their recognition to Beijing.

Had Ma been defeated, this would probably have caused Beijing to recalculate its approach.  We can now look forward to China’s forthcoming leadership change with interest.  It will be fascinating to see if the CCP continues with its current policy, which has been more fruitful than its past belligerence, or if it will become frustrated at the continued absence of any inclination among Taiwanese to return to the mainland.

Indeed, many Taiwanese feel that opening to China will threaten their jobs while only benefitting large Taiwanese businesses.  There are also concerns about becoming too dependent on the mainland.  Security typically trumps economics, so it remains likely that Taiwanese will remain dismissive of political unification.  Taiwanese voters are aware that a keenly fought election such as this one would be impossible under any ‘one country, many systems’ arrangement.

One of the most interesting themes of this poll has in fact been mainland interest in the election.  While the CCP limited coverage of the campaign and there have even been reports that mainland tour groups in Taiwan have been instructed to remain indoors on polling day, lest they be exposed to the idea that democracy may not be entirely unsuitable for Chinese, Sina Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter, has been full of comments wistfully expressing hopes that China might also one day hold elections. Taiwan may not be ready to unify with China; it may never do so, but if nothing else it does act as a rebuttal to those who argue that Chinese culture is inimical to democracy.

All Tied Up in Red Tape

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All tied up

Those of us who have lived, worked and travelled in Asia will be familiar with the bewildering bureaucratic hurdles to be negotiated.  While living in China, for example, I particularly enjoyed the occasional visits from my local friendly PSB officer who would pop in for a cup of tea, check that I was still living there and then wander off to parts unknown.

According to the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, however, China has nothing on India when it comes to bureaucracy.  The firm has surveyed over 1,300 executives in Asia in order to rank countries in the region.  The ranking is on a 10 point scale, with 10 being the worst possible score.  India scored 9.21, suggesting that it is the most bureaucratic country in Asia.  China, while no stranger to red tape, placed fifth with a score of 7.11.

This will doubtless be to the chagrin of India’s leaders who are seeking to compete with Beijing in all fields, including economically.  To India’s credit, it continues to post strong economic growth figures, but this report suggests that its impressive economic performance is in spite of the bureaucratic system, not because of the environment it creates.

The report links bureaucracy to corruption and in a country in which it is impossible to achieve anything without the assistance of officials, this is no surprise.  Such bureaucracy and corruption smothers the economy and prevents it from competing with China as strongly as it could.

At the other end of the scale, Singapore was rated least bureaucratic with a low score of 2.5, reflecting the enviable reputation that state’s civil service enjoys.

The full list is as follows:

India (9.21)
Vietnam (8.54)
Indonesia (8.37)
Philippines (7.57)
China (7.11)
Malaysia (5.89)
South Korea (5.87)
Japan (5.77)
Taiwan (5.57)
Thailand (5.25)
Hong Kong (3.53)
Singapore (2.25)

Key Trends in 2012

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As we reflect on 2011, it is obvious that it was a year of geopolitical flux, reflected most clearly in the so-called Arab Spring. Asia, however, was also an exciting arena.

The US pivoted its focus from its wars in the Middle East to the increasing challenge posed by China to Washington’s primacy in the Asia Pacific, while December saw the death of Kim Jong Il in North Korea and the succession of his son, Kim Jong Un. Speaking of leadership changes, Vladimir Putin announced that he would seek to return to his former presidential office, while another newly appointed president in Myanmar, Thein Sein, to the surprise of commentators, appeared to open the door to cautious liberalisation.

What, then, can we expect to be the key trends in 2012? While predicting the future is, to paraphrase Hillary Clinton, a fool’s errand, here are a number of issues to keep an eye on in 2012.

1. Look for China to reign in its recent belligerence and return to the smarter diplomacy it pursued up until around 2008. Recent assertiveness has alienated its neighbours and driven them into the welcoming arms of Washington. A diplomatic approach that focuses on building economic links and reassuring neighbours that it does not seek to dominate will be more fruitful that making outrageous claims of sovereignty.

2. Events in Myanmar this year will be telling. Will Aung San Suu Kyi be permitted to compete in fair elections? If she wins, will the result be honoured? How the administration of Thein Sein reacts will indicate how serious the government is about liberalising. A genuine opposition in parliament would be a significant step forward.

3. The U.S. also faces an important year. Look for Romney to win the Republican nomination. After that, all bets are off. Nevertheless, regardless of whether Obama or Romney wins, it is clear that we are now at the end of the post 9/11 age. The U.S. will focus on Asia and strengthening its primacy vis-à-vis China after its costly misadventures in the Middle East.

4. North Korea will continue to occupy the minds of policy makers. As always with the DPRK, there are more questions than answers. Will Kim Jong Un be supported by those around him? Will he be deposed or will he secure his own position? Will Pyongyang continue the belligerent approach highlighted by the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, or will it surprise everyone by tackling internal reform as China did under Deng Xiaoping?

5. The 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 will see a major leadership turnover. Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Wu Bangguo are all expected to retire, opening the way for the Politburo and its Standing Committee to welcome a large number of new faces. How will these new leaders handle an ever more complex society and what kind of foreign policy will they pursue?

6. Will Indonesia continue to consolidate its democracy or will it falter? Corruption allegations will continue to dismay Indonesians and shape their opinion of politics, while politicians on all sides seem to lack an appetite for reforms that could help Indonesia achieve its considerable potential.

7. How will U.S. and European financial travails affect Asia? The region will also suffer an economic slowdown, but ‘suffer’ may be the wrong word; after all, Beijing’s latest Five Year Plan aims to slow growth. Nevertheless, for a country that continues to rely on exports, continued economic trouble in the West will be a cause for significant concern. As China slows, neighbours such as South Korea and Japan will also suffer. An increase in protectionist sentiment, particularly in the U.S., will lead to much complaining and anti-dumping suits between Washington and Beijing.

8. Expect the balancing of security and economics in the Asia Pacific to become ever more precarious. Most states rely upon the U.S. for their security, while depending upon China for their economic prosperity. Though security typically trumps economics, no one wants to have to pick a side.

9. India can expect further growth, albeit of a slower nature, while its politicians will continue to be cautious, except when pursuing private business interests. Significant and much needed reform is unlikely to be embraced. Growth remains fuelled by domestic demand. A focus on increasing exports would be a significant source of growth and is likely to be pursued. Kashmir will continue to be a problem, but relations with Pakistan may improve, albeit glacially.

Asia Pacific Round Up, 15/12/11

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Below are a number of links to articles I have found interesting over the last week or so. Feel free to commence on them below or link to an interesting article of your own.

1. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8954315/Inside-Wukan-the-Chinese-village-that-fought-back.html
Malcolm Moore’s excellent article for The Telegraph about Wukan, a village rebelling against local officials’ misrule.

2. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/12/15/2003520765
Interesting story from Taiwan about the ROC’s interest in developing a its submarine capability.

3. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/sports/soccer/14iht-soccer14.html
The villagers in Wukan may not be happy with their economic prospects, but Nicolas Anelka won’t have to worry where his next baozi is coming from.

4. http://www.cfr.org/russian-fed/why-russian-protests-matter/p26773
Interesting CFR interview with Stephen Sestanovich regarding the recent anti-Putin protests in Russia.

5. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16190926
China’s new aircraft carrier has been spotted in the Yellow Sea.

6. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136718/evan-a-feigenbaum/chinas-pakistan-conundrum
America isn’t the only country with a difficult relationship with Pakistan.

7. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/15/deported-tamils-torture-sri-lanka?
Tamils forced to return to Sri Lanka face an uncertain future.

8. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Anna-Hazare-wants-Parliaments-Winter-Session-extended-to-pass-Lokpal/articleshow/11117623.cms
Anna Hazare continues his fight against corruption in India.

9. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MK08Dg01.html
Andrei Lankov on the rise of Kim Jong-eun.

10. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20111214a3.html
The Japan Times is reporting that Japan will choose the F35 as its 5th generation fighter.

Enjoy!

What explains Myanmar’s volte face?

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Myanmar President Thein Sein

While the Arab Spring has caused more ink to be spilled in attempts to explain why supposedly stable regimes were in reality brittle and vulnerable, another authoritarian state has begun to tentatively open up to the outside world. Much to the surprise of analysts who thought that the 2010 Myanmar elections would prove to be a sham that merely airbrushed the junta’s continued rule, recent events have suggested that the regime may be serious about liberalising.

Under the Presidency of Thein Sein, a former military officer, the new ‘civilian’ government, though it is composed of former senior military officers, has passed a new law loosening the ban on protests, though this has yet to be tested. Would-be protestors are required to apply for permission at least five days in advance.

Meanwhile, in an apparent attempt to address Myanmar’s ethnic divisions, the government has been reported to have called a ceasefire with the Shan State Army South, an armed ethnic rebel group. Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s iconic pro-democracy activist, has also been released from house arrest and it seems that she will be permitted to return to politics.

Finally, the most obvious sign that the regime in Naypyitaw is liberalising somewhat is US Secretary of State Clinton’s recent visit. Allowing such a prominent figure to visit stands in marked contrast to Myanmar’s rejection of American aid in the wake of Hurrican Nargis.

The source of such a surprising turnaround is unclear. Some analysts have suggested that a rapprochement with the West could be motivated by a desire to avoid becoming too dependent upon China. However, while Naypyitaw has relied upon Beijing for arms and investment, particularly in the resource sector, it is also true that Thailand and India have proved to be more lucrative export markets. Myanmar is not the Chinese vassal state it is often portrayed to be.

Others, meanwhile, have suggested that some in the regime may have been repelled by the scale of the violence employed against protesting Buddhist monks in 2007. The military officers who formed the junta and who are now comfortably ensconced in the current civilian government have not, however, done anything in the past to suggest that they are squeamish about using force to perpetuate their rule, so this seems an unlikely motivation.

It seems more likely that events in the Middle East during the Arab Spring have concentrated the minds of those at the head of government. It seems plausible that they hope to tread a fine line between liberalising enough to give the average citizen a stake in their society and losing control, a path that Beijing is also attempting to stick to.

They may also hope to copy Pyongyang’s playbook: as a point of convergence between the great powers in the region, Naypyitaw may hope to play off the Chinese, Indians and, to a lesser extent, the Americans, against each other to its own advantage.

In short, the reasons behind Myanmar’s surprising direction are unclear. Thein Sein may prove to be Myanmar’s Gorbachev, though it should be noted that Gorbachev had no desire to break up the USSR, he simply wishes to modernise it. It seems safe to assume that those in government wish to preserve their leadership and that this desire will influence future decision-making.

A Declicate Balancing Act

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We stand, in the words of Coral Bell, at the end of the Vasco da Gama era, having witnessed the apogee of Western domination over the international system.  For the first time in the modern era, Asia is taking its place alongside North America and Europe as a major centre of wealth, power and political weight.

A key driver of this re-emergence is the rise of China which has led scholars to consider the consequences for Asia’s strategic order.  Power is shifting East, goes the argument; power relativities are in flux. America, for so long the greatest power in Asia, will find its primacy to be increasingly unsustainable.

Inspired by the 19th century Concert of Europe, some commentators, seeking to mitigate the kind of conflict that has historically haunted power transitions, have suggested that Washington should surrender its primacy and instead embrace a system that would see it wield power in concert with the other great powers of Asia.  By sharing power with China, they argue, America could allow Beijing to maximise its power peacefully.

It seems obvious, however, that instead of the emergence of a concert of power, what is actually developing is an old-fashioned balance of power.

A balance of power creates order through the competition of major powers as each strives to improve its own position and prevent another from dominating. This balance restrains states’ behaviour as they realise that threats to the equilibrium will be met with balancing behaviour from other powers.  Such a balance seems to be emerging.

Firstly, at the recent APEC meeting, Washington signalled its determination to develop a Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade area that could eclipse the European market.  While the U.S. is keen to avoid the perception that it is marginalising Beijing, it has also made it clear that Chinese participation would depend upon further economic reforms of a nature unappealing to the leaders ensconced in Zhongnanhai.

This renewed focus on economic ties with Asia reflects Washington’s concern that the Asia Pacific is become more Asian to the detriment of U.S. interests.  With most countries in the region enjoying stronger trade relations with China than the U.S., Washington is concerned that some of its allies and partners may find themselves aligning with Beijing in the future.

Secondly, Obama’s visit to Australia can also be seen in this light.  It is a response to Chinese military modernisation and the resulting vulnerability of U.S.bases in Okinawa and Guam.  It is also a way of strengthening ties with a key U.S. regional ally, one in which some voices have called upon Canberra to distance itself from the U.S. as China rises.

Furthermore, as China’s rise is perceived to threaten US primacy, other countries are already engaged in external and internal balancing. Japan, for example, is strengthening its alliance with Washington, while Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper called for an expansion of Australia’s naval capabilities.  Seoul, meanwhile, is following a similar path of naval modernisation.

China has also been active, notably as a founding member of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, but has also focused on cultivating ties with Laos and competing with India for influence in Myanmar.

New Delhi itself is emerging as a key player, being courted by Washington as a potential balancer of China.  New Delhi, however, reflecting its desire to maintain strategic independence, is charting its own path, competing for influence in Myanmar and developing ties with Vietnam, a move that is welcome in Hanoi given its own concerns about China.  Moscow, though it has adopted a relatively passive posture, continues to be a major armaments and energy supplier to the region while its own conventional and nuclear arsenal bestows significant weight.  In short balancing is endemic in the region.

Finally, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s new-found determination to sell uranium to New Delhi is further evidence that a balance of power is being constructed.  Canberra’s refusal to sell uranium to India has been a significant source of tension in the relationship between the two countries.  Removing this obstacle to closer ties is a move that will allow a closer security relationship, such as that outlined in the AUSMIN 2011 Communique, to develop.

A balance of power model is not without its disadvantages.  Alliances would be temporary attempts to preserve the balance.  This raises the risk of miscalculation.  As Friedberg notes, “balance-of-power politics are seldom pretty, and they can be dangerous.”  World War One provides ample evidence of this.  Nevertheless, with skillful diplomacy and trust building measures, a balance of power would be able to mitigate competition and prevent it from heading inexorably towards strategic instability.  As US primacy fades, this may be the best Asia can hope for.

US to Upgrade Taiwan’s existing F-16 Fleet

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The Obama Administration has decided to upgrade Taiwan's existing F-16 fleet

The Obama Administration has decided not to sell Taiwan the latest variant of the F-16.  Instead of being permitted to purchase the latest F-16C/D variant, Taiwan will have to be satisfied with upgrades to its current, and ageing, F-16A/B fleet.

This decision seems likely to have been prompted by a number of factors.  Firstly, and most obviously, it seems probable that decision-makers took into account China’s objections to further arms sales to what Beijing considers a rogue province.  With the US keen to build ties with China, it will have been anxious to avoid a repeat of China’s reaction to Washington’s decision to sell Apache gunships to Taipei in 2010.  Beijing cut military-to-military ties with Washington in response.

Given recent scandals concerning Chinese espionage in Taiwan, It is also likely that the White House is concerned about the possibility of Beijing gaining access to information about the latest F-16 model.  The US refusal to consider selling its latest F-35 fighter is also indicative of this concern.

The decision to upgrade Taipei’s existing F-16 fleet was probably the most palatable option for the US.  Some analysts, for example, have argued that with upgrades to the F-16A/Bs, the aircraft may be almost equivalent to the latest variant, so Taiwan gets an improved aircraft, Beijing will object less vigourously than it would to the sale of new aircraft while Washington signals its continued support for Taiwan.

There has, however, been some criticism of the decision.  Some members of Congress, such as John Cornyn (R-Tex) have objected to mere upgrades and signaled their desire to force the Administration to sell the latest variant, highlighting the importance they attach to the support of Taipei in addition to the economic benefits to the US.  Lockheed Martin, hardly, it must be admitted, a disinterested observer, estimate that sale of the latest variant could generate as much as $8.7 billion and create up to 23, 000 jobs.  It has also been claimed that without the sale of the C/D model the F-16 production line may prove to be unsustainable.

Others, looking at the wider picture, have portrayed the decision as a capitulation to Chinese pressure which will fail to reassure US allies in the Asia Pacific of Washington’s continued commitment to their security.  Despite the best efforts of Secretary of State Clinton to assert that the US is back in Asia to stay, doubts persist among Asian allies about American staying power in the region.  Witness efforts by countries as diverse as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and even Vietnam to encourage a renewed and increased American presence in the region.  Should the US be seen to fail to support Taiwan, it may result in regional capitals drawing uncomfortable conclusions regarding Washington’s commitment to their own security.

In addition, while this upgrade will improve Taiwan’s existing F-16 fleet, it will do nothing to replace its Mirage and obsolescent F-5 aircraft, meaning that the lethality of Taiwan’s air assets will continue to deteriorate.  This stands in marked contrast to the Chinese trend of continued and rapid modernization of its air and ballistic missile forces, many of which are deployed within easy reach of Taiwan.

In conclusion, then, this decision seems to be an effort to satisfy everyone, but which satisfied no one.  US support for its allies will be called into question, Beijing will still object to the upgrades, and Taiwan does not get a new fighter with which to replace ageing aircraft and balance against China’s military build-up.

 

AUSMIN 2011 Analysis

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AUSMIN 2011 - 60th Anniversary of the ANZUS Alliance

 

The 2011 Ausmin meeting has recently concluded in San Francisco, marking the 60th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty, signed in the same city.  Details regarding basing rights are still being negotiated so the nature and extent of any future US deployment is uncertain, but it seems apparent that the US military will increase its footprint in Australia.

While the Australian side was keen to portray greater US access to Australian facilities as a continuation of the current situation, highlighting that US forces have enjoyed access for decades and that the strengthening of the relationship should pose no difficulties for China or any other Asia Pacific nation, US representatives were more forthright.  Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, stated that a strengthened relationship would send a clear signal in the Asia Pacific region to “those who would threaten us”.

It goes without saying that this is directed at China.  The US is keen to spread its forces more widely across the region to make it harder for China to hit them in the opening stages of any conflict and reassure its allies of its continuing commitment and ability to defend them.  To this end, the US is taking steps such as upgrading its base on Guam, stationing littoral combat ships in Singapore, and, potentially, increasing its forces on the Australian mainland.

Nevertheless, the 2011 communiqué remains balanced, calling for partnership with China, emphasising common interests and calling for military to military communication in order to prevent misunderstanding. Despite this stated desire to build bridges with China, the communiqué makes some pointed remarks concerning the South China Sea, a region in which Chinese assertiveness has raised concerns among other claimants, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines.  Asserting both the US’ and Australia’s national interest in freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, they oppose any attempt by one party to coerce or force another to accept its claims.  ‘Oppose’ is a particularly strong word, certainly more forthright than another word that might have been used in its place, such as condemn or reject, and it seems unlikely that it was chosen lightly.

The communiqué also mentions other countries.  It outlines support for increased training and interoperability between US, Australian, South Korean and Japanese forces to combat the threat posed to all by North Korea.  India, too, is highlighted as a potential partner.  The communiqué calls upon the US, Australia and India to identify areas in which they can co-operate such as maritime security, disaster relief and regional architecture.  India’s reaction to this call will be interesting.  It has its own concerns regarding Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean, but, despite the best efforts of the US, has been reluctant to align itself with the West, preferring to preserve what it calls its strategic independence.  In addition, Australia’s refusal to sell uranium to India is an enduring obstruction to improved co-operation between Canberra and New Delhi.

The meetings also considered appropriate responses to future online attacks, of which China is believed to be a major source. It has been agreed that a future cyber warfare attack will activate the ANZUS Treaty, reflecting previous US suggestions that an online attack may result in a very real-world military retaliation.

In conclusion, then, the outcome of the 2011 Ausmin meeting has been a continuation of current trends.  The US is keen to distribute its forces more widely across the Asia Pacific region and to reassure its allies of its continuing commitment to the region, while Australia is keen to encourage a strengthened US presence and commitment to the region as a hedge against China’s rise.  While the exact nature of the US military’s future presence in Australia has yet to be agreed, it seems likely that it will represent a strengthened American commitment to the Asia Pacific.

Sectarian Violence in Ambon, Indonesia

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Several hundred troops have been deployed by the Indonesian government to the city of Ambon which has seen an outbreak of sectarian violence.  Clashes in the eastern city, capital of Maluku Province, have injured between 80 and 150 people and resulted in five fatalities.

The violence exploded on Sunday in the wake of rumours blaming Christians for the death of a motorcycle taxi driver whom police have claimed died in a traffic accident.  Rumours were circulated by text message with the situation coming to a head as rival groups clashed at the funeral of Darvin Saiman, the victim.

This, however, is not the first time that Ambon has witnessed sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians.  Between 1999 and 2002, more than 9000 people were killed in religious violence, but the area has been relatively peaceful since then.

 

Ethnic Fighting Breaks Out in Myanmar

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Fighting has broken out between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and government forces in northern Myanmar near the Chinese border.  Myanmar state media is reporting that the government decided to act after the KIA attacked first and refused to withdraw form an area near a hydropower plant.

The fighting is centred in Kachin State, not far from where the Datang Corporation, a Chinese state owned enterprise (SOE), is building a hydroelectric plant on the Taping river.  It has been claimed by the corporation that 90% of the energy produced will go to Chinese companies across the border.

While Myanmar’s state media is reporting that the government’s intentions are “to protect its members and an important hydropower project of the nation”, this outbreak of fighting breaks a 1994 ceasefire with the KIA which allowed it to keep its  arms.  Analysts have claimed that the government in Naypyidaw is determined to assert its authority over the rebellious state whose militias have battled the regime for decades and have lately resisted pressure to incorporate their fighters into a state-run border security force.

It is also likely that Naypyidaw is under pressure from China, its major ally, to secure the region and protect its investment.  When the fighting broke out, approximately 200 Chinese engineers and other workers were swiftly repatriated across the border.

China has extensive and increasing hydropower investments in Myanmar and they are an increasing source of instability.  For the government, they are a welcome source of revenue.  The Burma River Network, for example, has claimed that China’s investments in Kachin State is worth $3.6bn and will result in annual power sales of $500m.

For those forced to live in their shadow, however, they create resentment as they see little of the revenue created, are displaced to make way for projects and have to live with the environmental consequences.  In addition to the fighting in Kachin State, both Shan State and Karenni State have seen recent fighting, prompted by dam construction, reports the Burma Rivers Network.

The Irrawaddy, an independent Burmese newspaper based in Thailand, has reported that representatives from the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the political wing of the Kachin independence movement, met with representatives of the Kachin Consultative Committee, a group of Kachin loyal to the central government, to discuss the possibility of a ceasefire on Friday 17th June.

The KCC representatives stated that the government wishes to call a ceasefire.  This assertion was rejected by the KIO because, it claimed, of the delegates’ inability to produce any form of evidence to confirm the intentions of the government.

With the KIO claiming that as many as 10,000 Kachins are now fleeing from the fighting, including some 200 who have crossed the border into China, no immediate prospect of a ceasefire, and a central government that remains unsympathetic to the claims of various ethnic groups for greater autonomy, far less independence, the prospects for reconciliation seem slight.