Category Archives: Australia

Japanese Submarines for Australia?

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JS_Souryu_Class_SS_in_KOBE

A recent report has suggested that Japan may sell submarine technology or even, in what would represent a sea change in Tokyo’s defence policy, an entire fleet of vessels to Australia.  Canberra is currently considering how to replace its existing Collins class submarine and has expressed an interest in acquiring Japanese submarine technology in recent years.  If such a transfer takes places, both countries would reap some benefits.  However, it may place Canberra in an awkward position in the future should, as has been reported, Tokyo insist on some kind of formal alliance in order to seal the deal.

Firstly, from a financial perspective, a Japanese decision to sell Soryu class boats to Australia would provide a boost to its manufacturers, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation.  Additional orders would also drive down the manufacturing cost, meaning that Tokyo and Canberra would have to shell out less cash to purchase future boats.

Australia would also benefit by acquiring a boat in all likelihood superior to anything that it could independently design and construct. The problems surrounding the Collins class submarine offers plentiful evidence of the challenges associated with designing and building such a complex piece of equipment.

Canberra’s attraction to the Soryu is therefore understandable.  It would obtain a proven, capable platform for substantially less than it would cost to construct an indigenously designed replacement for the Collins.  Better and cheaper?  It should be a no brainer.

From a strategic perspective, however, the decision is not so clear cut.  Reports suggest Tokyo would insist on some kind of formal alliance arrangement.  This is not unreasonable.  Both Japan and Australia are liberal democracies, share a strong economic relationship and enjoy extensive people-to-people ties.  However, though shared values may make an alliance easier to sustain, alliances are rarely founded on them.

What really matters are interests.  Australia, for example, is not straining to ally with Sweden; despite the many values both countries share, they have few common pressing interests.  In contrast, after Nixon went to China, Washington and Beijing developed a quasi-alliance, not because they shared common values, but because they had a common interest in containing the Soviet Union.

When we consider Tokyo and Canberra’s interests, the picture is a little murkier.  As Chinese power grows, Japan is casting around for all the friends it can find.  This is at the root of Shinzo Abe’s desire to strengthen Tokyo’s alliance with the U.S., loosen Japan’s constitutional restriction on the use of force, and cultivate ties with countries such as India, Vietnam, the Philippines and Australia.

This is clearly in Japan’s interests, but less clearly in Australia’s interests.  Before formally allying with Japan, Canberra should consider the possible consequences.  China and Japan are currently engaged in escalating competition in the East China Sea as they jockey for position around the Senkaku (Diaoyu to the Chinese) Islands.  While war is not imminent, it would be foolish to assume that it is impossible.  It is all too easy to envisage a scenario in which a rash decision made by a commander on the scene could lead to a clash that neither side wants but from which both may find it difficult to step back.

Should the worst happen, Japan would look to its allies for support and would expect them to honour their commitments.  If Australia was in a formal alliance with Japan, this would place Canberra in an extremely difficult decision.  Would it decide to contribute to military efforts directed against China, or would it disown its alliance with Japan?

This situation is not particularly likely, at least in the short term, but it illustrates the calculations that must be made before entering into such an arrangement with Tokyo.  Of course, Australian policymakers may decide that a decision to move closer to Japan may contribute toward deterring Beijing from upping the ante in the East China Sea.  Canberra certainly has an interest in maintaining the status quo in Asia and has no desire to see Beijing redraw maritime borders by the use, or threatened use, of force.

It is likely, however, that by moving closer to Japan, Canberra would exacerbate Beijing’s fear of containment, perhaps encouraging greater Chinese assertiveness in the future.  The Soryu would certainly boost Australia’s military capability, but any decision to acquire it must take into account the risk of getting dragged into conflicts Canberra may prefer to avoid and whether closer ties with Japan would serve Australia’s greater interest in helping to peacefully integrate China into the existing regional order.

Is Australia thinking about operating an aircraft carrier?

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The eagle-eyed Greg Sheridan and Sam Roggeveen recently noted that the Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbot, when announcing a decision to purchase 58 F-35s, hinted that future purchases may be of a different variant to the F-35As Australia has already ordered.

Abbot’s remark implies that Canberra may be considering the possibility of acquiring the F-35B variant (the short takeoff/vertical landing incarnation of the aircraft) suggesting that Australia is pondering the possibility of using at least one of its new LHDs as an aircraft carrier.

While no official announcement has been made to this effect, Abbot’s comment is too intriguing to ignore.  Should Australia acquire an aircraft carrier capability?  If Canberra decides to do so, what would be the strategic implications?

First, the price tag.  Establishing the unit price of the F-35B is a thankless task.  Lockheed Martin, for example, claims that a F-35B (excluding the engine!) will cost around US$104m (approx. AUD$111m) while other estimates suggest the cost may be as high as US$252m (approx. AUD$269m).  Whatever the ultimate cost, these figures serve to emphasise that acquiring an aircraft carrier capability would be extremely expensive.  Given Canberra’s relatively small defence budget, developing this capability would absorb a significant proportion of its finances.

Recently trends also advise caution.  Due to the proliferation of C4ISR capabilities, submarines and anti-ship missiles in Australia’s region, large surface ships have never been easier to locate and attack.  Developing a carrier capability would see Canberra placing a lot of its defence eggs in one slow-moving, highly sinkable basket.

In such an environment, a fleet composed of submarines and smaller, more numerous surface ships seems a better option for the defence of Australia.  Such a fleet would severely complicate any attempt to project force against the continent’s northern approaches.

However, the utility of an aircraft carrier lies less in its ability to defend its homeland than to project force against someone else’s.  By announcing its intention to operate a carrier, Canberra would be sending a strategic message to the region.  Regional states would conclude that Australia envisions the possibility of fighting a high-intensity war in Asia.

China, as highlighted by its response to Canberra’s 2009 Defence White Paper, would likely react badly to such an announcement, further complicating attempts to engage Beijing on issues such as confidence-building and transparency.  Indonesia, Australia’s closest neighbour of consequence, would also be concerned by a capability that would extend Australia’s ability to use strike aircraft over Indonesian territory.  This would further complicate attempts to build a stronger relationship with Jakarta.

Regardless of these arguments against operating an aircraft carrier, an obvious question presents itself: could Australia operate one?  Beyond the technical and logistical difficulties of operating such a vessel, the ship itself must be protected and sustained.  This would require the Navy to devote submarines, destroyers and supply vessels to escorting the carrier.  Given Australia’s limited defence budget, this would risk turning the bulk of the Navy into a carrier escort service, limiting its ability to tackle numerous simultaneous missions.

It’s now useful to consider how and where such a capability would be used.  An aircraft carrier could contribute to humanitarian or evacuation missions in the Asia Pacific region, but acquiring such a capability for these purposes is a disproportionate investment.  An aircraft carrier’s purpose lies in its ability to project, or threaten the use of, force.  It seems likelier that Canberra’s interest in operating a carrier would be prompted by the military options it would endow.

Canberra is already seeking to support the U.S. pivot by hosting marines in Darwin and has a great interest in helping to shape the regional strategic environment in a manner conducive to its interests.  Given that Australia views those interests best served by a strong U.S. presence, I assume that in a conflict Canberra would expect to operate in concert with the U.S. Navy, perhaps even to the extent of embedding its carrier with, say, the U.S. Seventh Fleet.  However, due to the amount of firepower that Washington can bring to bear in Asia, an Australian carrier would make a negligible strategic contribution, though it would be a welcome political fillip.

Should Canberra desire to support Washington in an Asian conflict, operating a diminutive carrier is probably not the most useful contribution it could make.  Far more telling would be a capability to deploy numerous conventional submarines that can haunt littoral waters and ambush enemy shipping or naval forces.  A potent submarine force would be more difficult to detect, harder to sink and would severely complicate enemy deployments by holding large surface vessels at risk.  It would also be welcomed by a U.S. Navy that only operates larger, nuclear-powered submarines which have a limited ability to hug enemy shorelines.

In conclusion, an Australian aircraft carrier would afford decision-makers a wider range of military options.  Indeed, given that developing such a capability would be a long-term project, if, as I have previously mused, the F-35 turns out to be the last manned fighter aircraft Australia operates, the LHD may ultimately prove its worth as a drone-carrier.

However, given the message it would send to the region, the resources required to create and sustain it, the difficulty of protecting it, and the limited strategic contribution it could make in a high-intensity conflict, an aircraft carrier is not the best use of Canberra’s defence dollars.  If Australia wishes to make a strong strategic contribution at sea and support Washington in high-intensity conflicts, it should spend its money on submarines, not slow, vulnerable surface vessels.

Australia and the F-35

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Australia has ordered 58 F-35 fighters.

Australia has ordered 58 F-35 fighters.

 

The Abbot government’s decision to order an additional 58 Joint Strike Fighters at a cost of $12.4 billion, raising the number on order to 72, has brought Australia close to its original target of a fleet of around 100 F-35s.  This order is Canberra’s largest defence purchase to date (the price-tag attached to Australia’s future submarine will eclipse it by a considerable margin) and will ensure that the RAAF continues to enjoy a capability edge in its region.

It’s not all clear skies, though.  The JSF program has been bedevilled by cost overruns, technical difficulties and allegations that China has acquired some of its technical specifications, allowing Beijing to rapidly develop its J-20 stealth fighter, China’s own attempt at building a 5th generation tactical aircraft.  Nevertheless, the F-35 is the only feasible 5th generation fighter available to Australia.  While Canberra could have decided to purchase additional F-18 Super Hornets, doing so would have risked falling behind the regional standard in coming decades.

What is striking about this procurement, however, is the number of airframes Canberra intends to purchase.  When the Howard government announced that Australia would participate in the F-35 program, it suggested that Australia would purchase around 100 aircraft.  While the country retains the option to buy additional jets, doing so may prove difficult given the competing demands facing Australia’s uncertain fiscal outlook.

This means that the RAAF will operate a relatively small fleet of tactical aircraft.  Exacerbating this issue is the fact that due to standard maintenance cycles and other unexpected issues, only some of these aircraft will be available for duty at any given time.  While aircraft availability would rise significantly in wartime because finding the required resources would be considered a key priority, the number of available aircraft would remain below 72 and could fall sharply when combat losses are factored in.

This reduction in the number of aircraft operated by the RAAF is an ongoing trend and is mirrored in air forces around the world.  As aircraft become more capable and expensive, states have chosen to operate fewer jets.  Nevertheless, while current aircraft are more capable than their predecessors and can therefore offer superior capability despite their fewer numbers, the fact remains that superior numbers have a virtue of their own.  After all, an aircraft can only be in one place at a time, an air force is likely to suffer losses in combat and the more airframes available, the more ordnance can be fired at an opponent.  In addition, the greater the number of aircraft a country operates, the greater the number of aircraft – all things being equal – an opponent will require to achieve air superiority.

Due to the phenomenal complexity of contemporary fighter aircraft, however, not to mention the concomitant expense, the number of countries able to design, build and deploy tactical jets is much reduced and will likely continue to fall.  The United States’ F-22 program was discontinued due to the expense of the aircraft while the F-35 and European Typhoon have been funded by an international consortium of countries.

This leads to three conclusions.  First, states will be increasingly reluctant to risk their fighter jets in combat.  They will represent such a spectacular investment of national resources that in the future states will only employ them against opponents with relatively poor air defence capabilities.  They will be used against peer competitors only as a last resort.

Secondly, if the current trends of increasing complexity and expense continue, the operation of cutting-edge fighter jets may be beyond the budgets of all but the wealthiest of states.  Middle and minor powers may conclude that their military budgets can be better spent on other platforms.

Thirdly, foremost among such platforms will be armed drones.  As UAV technology matures, it is likely that drones will become increasingly combat-capable.  If so, the F-35 may be the last manned tactical aircraft flown by an Australian pilot.

 

 

 

 

Theory vs Practice

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I just read Jim Molan’s response to Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper presented to the United Services Institute of the ACT.  It’s a typically forthright contribution from the former Major General, with some particularly strong criticism of Paul Dibb’s geographic determinism and support for an Australian maritime strategy that emphasises the importance of aerial and maritime forces at the expense of a heavy army.

However, what caught my eye was his dismissal of civilian academic strategists and assertion that “you should never be permitted to speak on strategy unless you have at least a passing familiarity with operations in the real world”.

While he was perhaps playing to his audience, as a student of strategy, I disagree with Molan’s position.  Indeed, lacking first hand military experience may even be a bonus if it means civilian strategists are devoid of bias toward a particular service arm and are able to see the bigger picture,  conceiving of military strategy as only one branch of grand strategy.

I am, however, keen to learn what readers think.  If you have an academic interest in strategy, do you believe you would have a deeper understanding of the field if you acquired first-hand experience?

If you do have military experience, has it afforded you greater insight into the art of strategy or do you believe you could have acquired comparable knowledge through academic study?

 

 

Submarines are essential for Australia

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The Strategist, a blog run by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute, posted an article concerning Australia’s future submarine today that arrived at some interesting conclusions.

In the post, the author, Nic Stuart, questions the necessity of a submarine capability, particularly in light of Canberra’s present budgetary difficulties.  He suggests that new robotic technologies could perform a similar function to the proposed submarines, that the money lavished on the submarines could be better spent on other ways to achieve Australia’s strategic objectives, and that there are better alternatives that ought to be explored.

While I think it’s valuable to question received wisdom, I find Stuart’s article unconvincing.  To begin with, the notion that robotic technology could replace a submarine within a relatively short timeline seems fanciful to me.  If the cost of acquiring a new submarine is expensive, developing a robotic alternative that could approach or match the capabilities of a traditional submarine would, I wager, be prohibitive and most likely beyond Australia’s ability if the travails experienced with the Collins class is any indication.

As for the matter of money, the sinew of strategy, there is no doubt that a new submarine will represent a large investment.  This, however, does not mean that it will not be a wise investment.  The first priority of the ADF is to defend the Australian continent.  While any conventional threat to Australia currently seems unlikely, it must be prepared for.  In addition, given the rapid shifts in relative power taking place in the Asia Pacific, only a fool would be willing to bet that Australia would not have cause to rue the absence of a submarine capability over the next thirty years or so.

Given Australia’s vast maritime approaches, I consider a submarine capability to be essential.  Even the presence of a limited number of submarines would severely complicate the planning of any opponent.  If any naval procurement program should be revisited it should be the construction of the Navy’s news air warfare destroyers.  They may make for fine photo opportunities for politicians, but that does not change the fact that they are large floating targets, easily overwhelmed by swarming tactics.

Stuart concludes that there are better ways to achieve Australia’s strategic objectives.  Unfortunately, however, he does not outline what they are.  While I concur that Australia’s limited defence budget could be spent more effectively, allowing its submarine capability to wither is not the answer.

Some thoughts on Asian literacy

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I haven’t finished reading the Australian Government’s Australia in the Asian Century White Paper yet, and I may blog on additional aspects of it in the coming days, but one thing that particularly strikes me  is the focus on the importance of learning Asian languages.

I don’t dispute that learning a foreign language is a laudable goal.  It opens up new worlds of literature, allows one the opportunity to converse and share ideas with people from another country, and affords an insight into the way users of that language think.  Learning another language is enjoyable (if, on occasion, frustrating) and gives one a real sense of achievement.

In the context of the debate surrounding Australia’s role in the Asian century, however, I’m not so sure that familiarity with an Asian language is essential.  It’s certainly desirable, but I believe that ensuring Australian school children are reasonably familiar with Asian history is much more important.

I enjoyed learning languages in school (French and Italian), but due to competing interests was unable to devote the necessary time required to become fluent.  I think the same will be true for the majority of Australian school children.  Only a relative few will pursue language study long enough to become fluent in, say, Mandarin.

In contrast, even if students choose not to history beyond their school years, being exposed to Asian history will give them some sort of framework they can use to interpret the decisions and policies of neighbouring countries.  Without a knowledge of Chinese history, for example, it’s difficult to understand the reasons behind Beijing’s recent actions surrounding the Senkaku islands.

Much of the debate surrounding Australia’s place in Asia in recent years has focused on the idea of increasing the ‘Asia literacy’ of its citizens.  Learning an Asian language is too intimidating for many people, but exposing school children to the history of the region seems to me the best way to increase ‘Asia literacy’ and encourage children to study the language of the country they are most interested in.

Lunch with Singapore’s PM

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Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore

On Friday 12 October, I had the privilege of attending an Asia Society lunch hosted by Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the Shangri La Hotel in Sydney. (Sometimes I really suffer for this blog)

In his remarks, the Prime Minister hailed the warm and increasing ties between his country and Australia.  He also highlighted the positive aspects of globalisation while noting that it has impacted negatively on job security and created increasing income gaps.

Nevertheless, the Premier was generally positive about Asia’s trajectory which is inextricably linked to China’s continued re-emergence on the world stage.  While the Premier stated that he believes a successful China will be positive for both the region and the world, he did acknowledge that managing the strategic consequences of China’s rise represents a major challenge for the international system.

The existing order does not have the luxury of slowly adapting to this changing order; it is taking place swiftly and, argued Lee, it will demand restraint and wisdom from the major powers in the region, particularly Washington.

Appealing to his audience, the Prime Minister, echoing the calls of such strategists as Hugh White, called upon Australia – an enthusiastic ally of the U.S. and a key Chinese trading partner – to contribute toward a peaceful shift in Asia’s strategic environment.

Despite these positive words, Singapore remains concerned about China’s rise.  It has agreed to host the U.S. Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships, while in his address the Premier acknowledged that ASEAN integration remains a work in progress, demanding patience and political will, in a seemingly oblique reference to Cambodia’s recent obstruction, at Beijing’s behest, of an ASEAN joint communiqué on the South China Sea.

Whatever the future holds, it is, as Mr. Lee stated, increasingly difficult for governments to look 10 or 20 years into the future, but Singapore seems reasonably well placed to take advantage of the continuing shift of economic weight from West to East.

Indonesia’s Military Development

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While governments around the world are tightening their belts in response to ongoing economic volatility, other countries, particularly in Asia, continue to modernise their military forces.  The modernisation process in China has created a cottage industry of analysts devoted to assessing the efficacy of PLA anti-ship missiles, military aircraft development and PLAN moves to develop a blue water naval capability.

China, however, is not the only Asian nation which is currently developing its armed forces.  Indonesia, too, has announced both an increase in military spending and specific procurement objectives.

Indonesia is looking at obtaining some sophisticated equipment.  It is negotiations with the Netherlands to purchase Leopard tanks, of which the Dutch government has offered 150.  Jakarta is also purchasing six Su-30 Sukhoi fighters and looking to upgrade its F-16 fleet.  Perhaps its most ambitious purchase is its planned $1.1 billion acquisition of three diesel electric submarines from South Korea.

Such modernisation should, however, be put in context.  Even with recent budget increases, Indonesia’s budget has barely edged above 1% of GDP.  Indeed, should the Yudyohono administration’s goal of spending 1.5% of GDP on its military by 2015 be achieved, this will remain a slight slice of the national pie compared to that spent by its regional neighbours such as China, Singapore and Australia.

Indonesia, like many other Asian countries, is now investing in sophisticated platforms common in Western military inventories.  As Asia becomes richer, it is natural that it invests greater funds in military procurement.  This reflects the regional trend of moving from fielding primarily land-based forces to developing maritime and aerial capabilities.  In addition, while new toys such as submarines, fighter jets and tanks may grab headlines, a large proportion of military spending increases will be devoted to improved wages for servicemen and maintaining existing equipment.

An improved Indonesian military will also be more capable of contributing to public goods such as anti-piracy missions and drug interdiction.  That said, Indonesian military modernisation will raise some concerns in Canberra.  While the Australian-Indonesian relationship has improved remarkably over the last decade, Australia has often looked toward Indonesia as a potential threat.  Indonesia’s democratic transition has done a great deal to mitigate such suspicion, but while Jakarta remains an unconsolidated democracy, Canberra will continue to hedge its bets.

Canberra’s main focus is on protecting its maritime approaches.  As Indonesia develops its navy and airforce, its ability to project force toward Australia will increase and this will pose a challenge to the dominance of the ADF.  As a key ADF aim is to remain the most technologically sophisticated military in its neighbourhood, it will be interesting to see how Canberra reacts.

In many ways, however, both countries are natural defence partners.  Australia’s small army and sophisticated maritime and aerial forces complement Indonesia’s large army and rudimentary navy and air force.  In the event of any challenge from North Asia, the ADF could offer important support to a threatened Jakarta, while Australian analysts have argued that the Indonesian archipelago can be used as a shield against any attack on its northern approaches.

In conclusion, Jakarta’s recent moves to invest greater resources in its military should not be seen as a threat.  Rather, it promises to increase security in its neighbourhood.  Australia should continue to assist Indonesia’s economic and political development to ensure that Jakarta remains a force for stability in Southeast Asia.

A Declicate Balancing Act

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We stand, in the words of Coral Bell, at the end of the Vasco da Gama era, having witnessed the apogee of Western domination over the international system.  For the first time in the modern era, Asia is taking its place alongside North America and Europe as a major centre of wealth, power and political weight.

A key driver of this re-emergence is the rise of China which has led scholars to consider the consequences for Asia’s strategic order.  Power is shifting East, goes the argument; power relativities are in flux. America, for so long the greatest power in Asia, will find its primacy to be increasingly unsustainable.

Inspired by the 19th century Concert of Europe, some commentators, seeking to mitigate the kind of conflict that has historically haunted power transitions, have suggested that Washington should surrender its primacy and instead embrace a system that would see it wield power in concert with the other great powers of Asia.  By sharing power with China, they argue, America could allow Beijing to maximise its power peacefully.

It seems obvious, however, that instead of the emergence of a concert of power, what is actually developing is an old-fashioned balance of power.

A balance of power creates order through the competition of major powers as each strives to improve its own position and prevent another from dominating. This balance restrains states’ behaviour as they realise that threats to the equilibrium will be met with balancing behaviour from other powers.  Such a balance seems to be emerging.

Firstly, at the recent APEC meeting, Washington signalled its determination to develop a Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade area that could eclipse the European market.  While the U.S. is keen to avoid the perception that it is marginalising Beijing, it has also made it clear that Chinese participation would depend upon further economic reforms of a nature unappealing to the leaders ensconced in Zhongnanhai.

This renewed focus on economic ties with Asia reflects Washington’s concern that the Asia Pacific is become more Asian to the detriment of U.S. interests.  With most countries in the region enjoying stronger trade relations with China than the U.S., Washington is concerned that some of its allies and partners may find themselves aligning with Beijing in the future.

Secondly, Obama’s visit to Australia can also be seen in this light.  It is a response to Chinese military modernisation and the resulting vulnerability of U.S.bases in Okinawa and Guam.  It is also a way of strengthening ties with a key U.S. regional ally, one in which some voices have called upon Canberra to distance itself from the U.S. as China rises.

Furthermore, as China’s rise is perceived to threaten US primacy, other countries are already engaged in external and internal balancing. Japan, for example, is strengthening its alliance with Washington, while Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper called for an expansion of Australia’s naval capabilities.  Seoul, meanwhile, is following a similar path of naval modernisation.

China has also been active, notably as a founding member of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, but has also focused on cultivating ties with Laos and competing with India for influence in Myanmar.

New Delhi itself is emerging as a key player, being courted by Washington as a potential balancer of China.  New Delhi, however, reflecting its desire to maintain strategic independence, is charting its own path, competing for influence in Myanmar and developing ties with Vietnam, a move that is welcome in Hanoi given its own concerns about China.  Moscow, though it has adopted a relatively passive posture, continues to be a major armaments and energy supplier to the region while its own conventional and nuclear arsenal bestows significant weight.  In short balancing is endemic in the region.

Finally, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s new-found determination to sell uranium to New Delhi is further evidence that a balance of power is being constructed.  Canberra’s refusal to sell uranium to India has been a significant source of tension in the relationship between the two countries.  Removing this obstacle to closer ties is a move that will allow a closer security relationship, such as that outlined in the AUSMIN 2011 Communique, to develop.

A balance of power model is not without its disadvantages.  Alliances would be temporary attempts to preserve the balance.  This raises the risk of miscalculation.  As Friedberg notes, “balance-of-power politics are seldom pretty, and they can be dangerous.”  World War One provides ample evidence of this.  Nevertheless, with skillful diplomacy and trust building measures, a balance of power would be able to mitigate competition and prevent it from heading inexorably towards strategic instability.  As US primacy fades, this may be the best Asia can hope for.

AUSMIN 2011 Analysis

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AUSMIN 2011 - 60th Anniversary of the ANZUS Alliance

 

The 2011 Ausmin meeting has recently concluded in San Francisco, marking the 60th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty, signed in the same city.  Details regarding basing rights are still being negotiated so the nature and extent of any future US deployment is uncertain, but it seems apparent that the US military will increase its footprint in Australia.

While the Australian side was keen to portray greater US access to Australian facilities as a continuation of the current situation, highlighting that US forces have enjoyed access for decades and that the strengthening of the relationship should pose no difficulties for China or any other Asia Pacific nation, US representatives were more forthright.  Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, stated that a strengthened relationship would send a clear signal in the Asia Pacific region to “those who would threaten us”.

It goes without saying that this is directed at China.  The US is keen to spread its forces more widely across the region to make it harder for China to hit them in the opening stages of any conflict and reassure its allies of its continuing commitment and ability to defend them.  To this end, the US is taking steps such as upgrading its base on Guam, stationing littoral combat ships in Singapore, and, potentially, increasing its forces on the Australian mainland.

Nevertheless, the 2011 communiqué remains balanced, calling for partnership with China, emphasising common interests and calling for military to military communication in order to prevent misunderstanding. Despite this stated desire to build bridges with China, the communiqué makes some pointed remarks concerning the South China Sea, a region in which Chinese assertiveness has raised concerns among other claimants, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines.  Asserting both the US’ and Australia’s national interest in freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, they oppose any attempt by one party to coerce or force another to accept its claims.  ‘Oppose’ is a particularly strong word, certainly more forthright than another word that might have been used in its place, such as condemn or reject, and it seems unlikely that it was chosen lightly.

The communiqué also mentions other countries.  It outlines support for increased training and interoperability between US, Australian, South Korean and Japanese forces to combat the threat posed to all by North Korea.  India, too, is highlighted as a potential partner.  The communiqué calls upon the US, Australia and India to identify areas in which they can co-operate such as maritime security, disaster relief and regional architecture.  India’s reaction to this call will be interesting.  It has its own concerns regarding Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean, but, despite the best efforts of the US, has been reluctant to align itself with the West, preferring to preserve what it calls its strategic independence.  In addition, Australia’s refusal to sell uranium to India is an enduring obstruction to improved co-operation between Canberra and New Delhi.

The meetings also considered appropriate responses to future online attacks, of which China is believed to be a major source. It has been agreed that a future cyber warfare attack will activate the ANZUS Treaty, reflecting previous US suggestions that an online attack may result in a very real-world military retaliation.

In conclusion, then, the outcome of the 2011 Ausmin meeting has been a continuation of current trends.  The US is keen to distribute its forces more widely across the Asia Pacific region and to reassure its allies of its continuing commitment to the region, while Australia is keen to encourage a strengthened US presence and commitment to the region as a hedge against China’s rise.  While the exact nature of the US military’s future presence in Australia has yet to be agreed, it seems likely that it will represent a strengthened American commitment to the Asia Pacific.