Category Archives: Defence

Japanese Submarines for Australia?

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JS_Souryu_Class_SS_in_KOBE

A recent report has suggested that Japan may sell submarine technology or even, in what would represent a sea change in Tokyo’s defence policy, an entire fleet of vessels to Australia.  Canberra is currently considering how to replace its existing Collins class submarine and has expressed an interest in acquiring Japanese submarine technology in recent years.  If such a transfer takes places, both countries would reap some benefits.  However, it may place Canberra in an awkward position in the future should, as has been reported, Tokyo insist on some kind of formal alliance in order to seal the deal.

Firstly, from a financial perspective, a Japanese decision to sell Soryu class boats to Australia would provide a boost to its manufacturers, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation.  Additional orders would also drive down the manufacturing cost, meaning that Tokyo and Canberra would have to shell out less cash to purchase future boats.

Australia would also benefit by acquiring a boat in all likelihood superior to anything that it could independently design and construct. The problems surrounding the Collins class submarine offers plentiful evidence of the challenges associated with designing and building such a complex piece of equipment.

Canberra’s attraction to the Soryu is therefore understandable.  It would obtain a proven, capable platform for substantially less than it would cost to construct an indigenously designed replacement for the Collins.  Better and cheaper?  It should be a no brainer.

From a strategic perspective, however, the decision is not so clear cut.  Reports suggest Tokyo would insist on some kind of formal alliance arrangement.  This is not unreasonable.  Both Japan and Australia are liberal democracies, share a strong economic relationship and enjoy extensive people-to-people ties.  However, though shared values may make an alliance easier to sustain, alliances are rarely founded on them.

What really matters are interests.  Australia, for example, is not straining to ally with Sweden; despite the many values both countries share, they have few common pressing interests.  In contrast, after Nixon went to China, Washington and Beijing developed a quasi-alliance, not because they shared common values, but because they had a common interest in containing the Soviet Union.

When we consider Tokyo and Canberra’s interests, the picture is a little murkier.  As Chinese power grows, Japan is casting around for all the friends it can find.  This is at the root of Shinzo Abe’s desire to strengthen Tokyo’s alliance with the U.S., loosen Japan’s constitutional restriction on the use of force, and cultivate ties with countries such as India, Vietnam, the Philippines and Australia.

This is clearly in Japan’s interests, but less clearly in Australia’s interests.  Before formally allying with Japan, Canberra should consider the possible consequences.  China and Japan are currently engaged in escalating competition in the East China Sea as they jockey for position around the Senkaku (Diaoyu to the Chinese) Islands.  While war is not imminent, it would be foolish to assume that it is impossible.  It is all too easy to envisage a scenario in which a rash decision made by a commander on the scene could lead to a clash that neither side wants but from which both may find it difficult to step back.

Should the worst happen, Japan would look to its allies for support and would expect them to honour their commitments.  If Australia was in a formal alliance with Japan, this would place Canberra in an extremely difficult decision.  Would it decide to contribute to military efforts directed against China, or would it disown its alliance with Japan?

This situation is not particularly likely, at least in the short term, but it illustrates the calculations that must be made before entering into such an arrangement with Tokyo.  Of course, Australian policymakers may decide that a decision to move closer to Japan may contribute toward deterring Beijing from upping the ante in the East China Sea.  Canberra certainly has an interest in maintaining the status quo in Asia and has no desire to see Beijing redraw maritime borders by the use, or threatened use, of force.

It is likely, however, that by moving closer to Japan, Canberra would exacerbate Beijing’s fear of containment, perhaps encouraging greater Chinese assertiveness in the future.  The Soryu would certainly boost Australia’s military capability, but any decision to acquire it must take into account the risk of getting dragged into conflicts Canberra may prefer to avoid and whether closer ties with Japan would serve Australia’s greater interest in helping to peacefully integrate China into the existing regional order.

Is Australia thinking about operating an aircraft carrier?

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The eagle-eyed Greg Sheridan and Sam Roggeveen recently noted that the Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbot, when announcing a decision to purchase 58 F-35s, hinted that future purchases may be of a different variant to the F-35As Australia has already ordered.

Abbot’s remark implies that Canberra may be considering the possibility of acquiring the F-35B variant (the short takeoff/vertical landing incarnation of the aircraft) suggesting that Australia is pondering the possibility of using at least one of its new LHDs as an aircraft carrier.

While no official announcement has been made to this effect, Abbot’s comment is too intriguing to ignore.  Should Australia acquire an aircraft carrier capability?  If Canberra decides to do so, what would be the strategic implications?

First, the price tag.  Establishing the unit price of the F-35B is a thankless task.  Lockheed Martin, for example, claims that a F-35B (excluding the engine!) will cost around US$104m (approx. AUD$111m) while other estimates suggest the cost may be as high as US$252m (approx. AUD$269m).  Whatever the ultimate cost, these figures serve to emphasise that acquiring an aircraft carrier capability would be extremely expensive.  Given Canberra’s relatively small defence budget, developing this capability would absorb a significant proportion of its finances.

Recently trends also advise caution.  Due to the proliferation of C4ISR capabilities, submarines and anti-ship missiles in Australia’s region, large surface ships have never been easier to locate and attack.  Developing a carrier capability would see Canberra placing a lot of its defence eggs in one slow-moving, highly sinkable basket.

In such an environment, a fleet composed of submarines and smaller, more numerous surface ships seems a better option for the defence of Australia.  Such a fleet would severely complicate any attempt to project force against the continent’s northern approaches.

However, the utility of an aircraft carrier lies less in its ability to defend its homeland than to project force against someone else’s.  By announcing its intention to operate a carrier, Canberra would be sending a strategic message to the region.  Regional states would conclude that Australia envisions the possibility of fighting a high-intensity war in Asia.

China, as highlighted by its response to Canberra’s 2009 Defence White Paper, would likely react badly to such an announcement, further complicating attempts to engage Beijing on issues such as confidence-building and transparency.  Indonesia, Australia’s closest neighbour of consequence, would also be concerned by a capability that would extend Australia’s ability to use strike aircraft over Indonesian territory.  This would further complicate attempts to build a stronger relationship with Jakarta.

Regardless of these arguments against operating an aircraft carrier, an obvious question presents itself: could Australia operate one?  Beyond the technical and logistical difficulties of operating such a vessel, the ship itself must be protected and sustained.  This would require the Navy to devote submarines, destroyers and supply vessels to escorting the carrier.  Given Australia’s limited defence budget, this would risk turning the bulk of the Navy into a carrier escort service, limiting its ability to tackle numerous simultaneous missions.

It’s now useful to consider how and where such a capability would be used.  An aircraft carrier could contribute to humanitarian or evacuation missions in the Asia Pacific region, but acquiring such a capability for these purposes is a disproportionate investment.  An aircraft carrier’s purpose lies in its ability to project, or threaten the use of, force.  It seems likelier that Canberra’s interest in operating a carrier would be prompted by the military options it would endow.

Canberra is already seeking to support the U.S. pivot by hosting marines in Darwin and has a great interest in helping to shape the regional strategic environment in a manner conducive to its interests.  Given that Australia views those interests best served by a strong U.S. presence, I assume that in a conflict Canberra would expect to operate in concert with the U.S. Navy, perhaps even to the extent of embedding its carrier with, say, the U.S. Seventh Fleet.  However, due to the amount of firepower that Washington can bring to bear in Asia, an Australian carrier would make a negligible strategic contribution, though it would be a welcome political fillip.

Should Canberra desire to support Washington in an Asian conflict, operating a diminutive carrier is probably not the most useful contribution it could make.  Far more telling would be a capability to deploy numerous conventional submarines that can haunt littoral waters and ambush enemy shipping or naval forces.  A potent submarine force would be more difficult to detect, harder to sink and would severely complicate enemy deployments by holding large surface vessels at risk.  It would also be welcomed by a U.S. Navy that only operates larger, nuclear-powered submarines which have a limited ability to hug enemy shorelines.

In conclusion, an Australian aircraft carrier would afford decision-makers a wider range of military options.  Indeed, given that developing such a capability would be a long-term project, if, as I have previously mused, the F-35 turns out to be the last manned fighter aircraft Australia operates, the LHD may ultimately prove its worth as a drone-carrier.

However, given the message it would send to the region, the resources required to create and sustain it, the difficulty of protecting it, and the limited strategic contribution it could make in a high-intensity conflict, an aircraft carrier is not the best use of Canberra’s defence dollars.  If Australia wishes to make a strong strategic contribution at sea and support Washington in high-intensity conflicts, it should spend its money on submarines, not slow, vulnerable surface vessels.

Preferences and Vital Interests

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Shen Dingli’s recent Foreign Policy article makes a common criticism against recent U.S. policy toward Syria and Crimea.

He writes that,

 “…the record of Obama’s administration, and that of his predecessor’s, is of security assurances backed up lately only by inaction.  The United States has failed to stop Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It failed to stand up to Russia’s adventurism in the formerly Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, or in Crimea in March of this year.  Granted, none of these places are treaty allies of the United States.  But if the United States won’t face Russia in Europe, will it really challenge China in the East and South China seas?”

This echoes arguments made by other critics of the Obama Administration.  If the U.S. doesn’t stand up to Syria and Russia, they ask, how can it hope to deter China?

Such critics fear that if Washington’s Asian allies believe it doesn’t possess the will to enforce its preferences in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, they will question America’s willingness to defend them and seek to either bandwagon with Beijing or make greater provisions for their own defence, further destabilising the Asia-Pacific region.

Such criticism, however, stems from a failure to appreciate that judicious strategy distinguishes between preferences and vital interests.

Washington, of course, would prefer a secular liberal democracy to emerge in Syria.  It would also prefer a liberal democratic Ukraine free from Moscow’s malign influence.  Neither of these outcomes, however, can be easily achieved, if at all.  More to the point, the U.S. does not have a vital interest – defined as those interests which affect one’s security and that a state will use force to defend – in the outcome of either conflict.

First, Syria.  Chastened by its misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington is not keen to get drawn into another Middle Eastern conflict.  Getting bogged down in another sectarian conflict in the Arab world would do little to promote U.S. security and would devour resources better devoted to supporting the Washington’s pivot to Asia.

As for Crimea, Washington has offered it no security assurances and is not treaty-bound to defend it.  Using force to do so would run the risk of a clash between U.S. and Russian forces.  The defence of Crimea or Ukraine, a weak, impoverished state on the periphery of Europe, is not worth risking a clash with a nuclear-armed Russia that has a greater stake in the outcome than Washington.

For those who argue that allowing Moscow to dissect Ukraine will encourage Russian revanchism, emboldening it to seek to regain territory it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed, a little perspective is required.

Its latest actions have weakened, not strengthened Russia.  It has estranged itself from Europe and its neighbours will now be more alert to any actions that suggest Moscow is looking to redraw its borders.  Should it seek to embark on such a course, it will likely result in a balancing coalition forming against it.

Should a European balancing coalition form against it, Russia would find itself in a weak strategic position.  Europe possesses a population five times greater than Russia and enjoys a GDP eight times larger than its eastern neighbour.  The U.S. could certainly act as an offshore balancer, but it need not man the front lines.  Contemporary Russia is not the Soviet Union; Washington should expect its European allies to do the heavy-lifting.

What, then, does this mean for Asia?  I believe that Asian leaders recognise these realities and privately applaud Washington’s decision to remain relatively aloof from the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine.  After all, it isn’t in their interests for Washington to dilute its strength by taking on new security commitments in the Middle East and Europe and it certainly isn’t in their interests for the U.S. to get bogged down in conflicts in these regions.

In conclusion, it is telling that only one Asian power would identify a benefit in U.S. involvement in Syria and Ukraine.  It’s the same power that benefited from Washington’s strategic distraction in the War on Terror and the ill-judged wars it fostered.  Beijing would be only too happy to see Washington’s strategic attention focused on Syria and Russia.  By declining to get involved in conflicts of marginal importance to its security, America is better able to marshal its resources for the purpose that will shape its security in the 21st century, balancing China’s rise.

 

The Beginning of the End for Surface Combatants?

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The Zumwalt Class

The Zumwalt Class

 

Foreign Policy has recently posted a story about the U.S. Navy’s new Zumwalt class guided missile destroyer.  The USN currently plans to construct three vessels of this class, at a cost of $7 billion per unit.  This is a huge sum of money, particularly as some naval architects have questioned its ability to remain afloat if struck from behind by a powerful wave.

While it seems difficult to believe that the USN would build a ship with such an obvious and potentially disastrous design flaw, one other comment in the article caught my eye.

The article highlights the phenomenal power generation capabilities of the Zumwalt class, noting that it may serve as a test platform for Boeing’s Free Electron Laser Weapon system.  That’s a laser gun to a layman.  In addition, it may one day sport a rail gun.

While no one is suggesting that these weapons will be mass produced and fitted on USN ships in the short to medium term – the example of ballistic missile defence illustrates the difficulties of bringing complex military technologies to fruition – should these weapons become part of the USN’s standard inventory, it would raise questions about the long-term future of major surface combatants.

Surface ships are already extremely vulnerable military platforms.  They are hugely expensive, increasingly easy to locate, move at relatively slow speeds and can be sunk by comparatively cheap weaponry such as anti ship missiles or mines.  In response, as illustrated by the Zumwalt, naval architects are turning to stealthy designs as a way to increase the survivability of surface vessels.  Should lasers or rail guns become de rigeur, however, it is difficult to imagine how surface vessels could effectively defend against them upon being located.

Perhaps the Zumwalt represents the final generation of major surface combatants.  Should Washington field such weapons, it seems reasonable to expect that they will soon be adopted by other advanced navies.  At this point, continuing to design and deploy surface combatants would appear to be an ineffective use of resources.  Submarine forces would be the obvious beneficiary as their ability to avoid detection would be even more attractive to naval planners.
 

 

Theory vs Practice

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I just read Jim Molan’s response to Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper presented to the United Services Institute of the ACT.  It’s a typically forthright contribution from the former Major General, with some particularly strong criticism of Paul Dibb’s geographic determinism and support for an Australian maritime strategy that emphasises the importance of aerial and maritime forces at the expense of a heavy army.

However, what caught my eye was his dismissal of civilian academic strategists and assertion that “you should never be permitted to speak on strategy unless you have at least a passing familiarity with operations in the real world”.

While he was perhaps playing to his audience, as a student of strategy, I disagree with Molan’s position.  Indeed, lacking first hand military experience may even be a bonus if it means civilian strategists are devoid of bias toward a particular service arm and are able to see the bigger picture,  conceiving of military strategy as only one branch of grand strategy.

I am, however, keen to learn what readers think.  If you have an academic interest in strategy, do you believe you would have a deeper understanding of the field if you acquired first-hand experience?

If you do have military experience, has it afforded you greater insight into the art of strategy or do you believe you could have acquired comparable knowledge through academic study?

 

 

Submarines are essential for Australia

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The Strategist, a blog run by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute, posted an article concerning Australia’s future submarine today that arrived at some interesting conclusions.

In the post, the author, Nic Stuart, questions the necessity of a submarine capability, particularly in light of Canberra’s present budgetary difficulties.  He suggests that new robotic technologies could perform a similar function to the proposed submarines, that the money lavished on the submarines could be better spent on other ways to achieve Australia’s strategic objectives, and that there are better alternatives that ought to be explored.

While I think it’s valuable to question received wisdom, I find Stuart’s article unconvincing.  To begin with, the notion that robotic technology could replace a submarine within a relatively short timeline seems fanciful to me.  If the cost of acquiring a new submarine is expensive, developing a robotic alternative that could approach or match the capabilities of a traditional submarine would, I wager, be prohibitive and most likely beyond Australia’s ability if the travails experienced with the Collins class is any indication.

As for the matter of money, the sinew of strategy, there is no doubt that a new submarine will represent a large investment.  This, however, does not mean that it will not be a wise investment.  The first priority of the ADF is to defend the Australian continent.  While any conventional threat to Australia currently seems unlikely, it must be prepared for.  In addition, given the rapid shifts in relative power taking place in the Asia Pacific, only a fool would be willing to bet that Australia would not have cause to rue the absence of a submarine capability over the next thirty years or so.

Given Australia’s vast maritime approaches, I consider a submarine capability to be essential.  Even the presence of a limited number of submarines would severely complicate the planning of any opponent.  If any naval procurement program should be revisited it should be the construction of the Navy’s news air warfare destroyers.  They may make for fine photo opportunities for politicians, but that does not change the fact that they are large floating targets, easily overwhelmed by swarming tactics.

Stuart concludes that there are better ways to achieve Australia’s strategic objectives.  Unfortunately, however, he does not outline what they are.  While I concur that Australia’s limited defence budget could be spent more effectively, allowing its submarine capability to wither is not the answer.

An increased U.S. presence in the Philippines is on the cards

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A proposed deal with the Philippes may see the U.S. Navy operating ships from that country

The Washington Post has reported that U.S. and Filipino officials are in the early stages of negotiating a deal that would see an expansion of Washington’s military presence in the Philippines.

Though the U.S. has stationed a small number of special forces troops in the country to assist Manila’s efforts to combat Islamist rebels, this deal, if successfully concluded, could allow the U.S. Navy to operate ships from the Philippines and rotate troops through bases there in addition to staging joint exercises.  Washington used to operate from a large base in the Philippines’ Subic Bay but left in 1992 when Manila decided not to renew the basing agreement.

This proposed new arrangement reflects increasing Filipino concern regarding assertive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea (which Manila has taken to naming the West Philippine Sea in an effort to bolster its own territorial claims).  It would also dovetail with the Obama administration’s pivot toward the Asia Pacific which has seen, for example, moves to station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and a deal with Australia increasing military co-operation between the U.S. military and Australian Defence Force.

A deal would serve U.S. efforts to disperse its forces in the Asia Pacific theatre, making them less vulnerable to attack in the early stages of any conflict with China.  An increased U.S. Navy presence in South East Asia would be key to any strategy of choking Chinese supply routes through the South China Sea and Straits of Malacca.

If these early negotiations are successful, further meetings will be held in March.  As such an arrangement would be in the stated interests of both states, it seems likely that some kind of agreement will be reached.

Asia Pacific Round Up, 15/12/11

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Below are a number of links to articles I have found interesting over the last week or so. Feel free to commence on them below or link to an interesting article of your own.

1. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8954315/Inside-Wukan-the-Chinese-village-that-fought-back.html
Malcolm Moore’s excellent article for The Telegraph about Wukan, a village rebelling against local officials’ misrule.

2. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/12/15/2003520765
Interesting story from Taiwan about the ROC’s interest in developing a its submarine capability.

3. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/sports/soccer/14iht-soccer14.html
The villagers in Wukan may not be happy with their economic prospects, but Nicolas Anelka won’t have to worry where his next baozi is coming from.

4. http://www.cfr.org/russian-fed/why-russian-protests-matter/p26773
Interesting CFR interview with Stephen Sestanovich regarding the recent anti-Putin protests in Russia.

5. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16190926
China’s new aircraft carrier has been spotted in the Yellow Sea.

6. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136718/evan-a-feigenbaum/chinas-pakistan-conundrum
America isn’t the only country with a difficult relationship with Pakistan.

7. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/15/deported-tamils-torture-sri-lanka?
Tamils forced to return to Sri Lanka face an uncertain future.

8. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Anna-Hazare-wants-Parliaments-Winter-Session-extended-to-pass-Lokpal/articleshow/11117623.cms
Anna Hazare continues his fight against corruption in India.

9. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MK08Dg01.html
Andrei Lankov on the rise of Kim Jong-eun.

10. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20111214a3.html
The Japan Times is reporting that Japan will choose the F35 as its 5th generation fighter.

Enjoy!

US to Upgrade Taiwan’s existing F-16 Fleet

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The Obama Administration has decided to upgrade Taiwan's existing F-16 fleet

The Obama Administration has decided not to sell Taiwan the latest variant of the F-16.  Instead of being permitted to purchase the latest F-16C/D variant, Taiwan will have to be satisfied with upgrades to its current, and ageing, F-16A/B fleet.

This decision seems likely to have been prompted by a number of factors.  Firstly, and most obviously, it seems probable that decision-makers took into account China’s objections to further arms sales to what Beijing considers a rogue province.  With the US keen to build ties with China, it will have been anxious to avoid a repeat of China’s reaction to Washington’s decision to sell Apache gunships to Taipei in 2010.  Beijing cut military-to-military ties with Washington in response.

Given recent scandals concerning Chinese espionage in Taiwan, It is also likely that the White House is concerned about the possibility of Beijing gaining access to information about the latest F-16 model.  The US refusal to consider selling its latest F-35 fighter is also indicative of this concern.

The decision to upgrade Taipei’s existing F-16 fleet was probably the most palatable option for the US.  Some analysts, for example, have argued that with upgrades to the F-16A/Bs, the aircraft may be almost equivalent to the latest variant, so Taiwan gets an improved aircraft, Beijing will object less vigourously than it would to the sale of new aircraft while Washington signals its continued support for Taiwan.

There has, however, been some criticism of the decision.  Some members of Congress, such as John Cornyn (R-Tex) have objected to mere upgrades and signaled their desire to force the Administration to sell the latest variant, highlighting the importance they attach to the support of Taipei in addition to the economic benefits to the US.  Lockheed Martin, hardly, it must be admitted, a disinterested observer, estimate that sale of the latest variant could generate as much as $8.7 billion and create up to 23, 000 jobs.  It has also been claimed that without the sale of the C/D model the F-16 production line may prove to be unsustainable.

Others, looking at the wider picture, have portrayed the decision as a capitulation to Chinese pressure which will fail to reassure US allies in the Asia Pacific of Washington’s continued commitment to their security.  Despite the best efforts of Secretary of State Clinton to assert that the US is back in Asia to stay, doubts persist among Asian allies about American staying power in the region.  Witness efforts by countries as diverse as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and even Vietnam to encourage a renewed and increased American presence in the region.  Should the US be seen to fail to support Taiwan, it may result in regional capitals drawing uncomfortable conclusions regarding Washington’s commitment to their own security.

In addition, while this upgrade will improve Taiwan’s existing F-16 fleet, it will do nothing to replace its Mirage and obsolescent F-5 aircraft, meaning that the lethality of Taiwan’s air assets will continue to deteriorate.  This stands in marked contrast to the Chinese trend of continued and rapid modernization of its air and ballistic missile forces, many of which are deployed within easy reach of Taiwan.

In conclusion, then, this decision seems to be an effort to satisfy everyone, but which satisfied no one.  US support for its allies will be called into question, Beijing will still object to the upgrades, and Taiwan does not get a new fighter with which to replace ageing aircraft and balance against China’s military build-up.

 

South Korea to Deploy Apache Gunships to Baengnyeong Island?

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An anonymous defence source has suggested South Korea will deploy Apache gunships to Baengnyeong Island

 

South Korea’s Yonhap news agency has reported that the country is considering the deployment of Apache gunships to Baengnyeong Island.  A hangar is currently under construction in preparation for the arrival of the helicopters.

Yonhap quotes an anonymous defence source who claims the deployment is intended to counter the possibility of a seaborne attack by DPRK commandos.  The North’s construction of a larger-than-expected naval base in Hwanghae Province has prompted these concerns. The base, situated a mere 50 kilometres from Baengnyeong Island, is thought to be capable of supporting around 60 hovercraft.

The helicopter hangar currently under construction is expected to be completed by the end of the year and will be ready to accommodate the gunships which are expected to be delivered in 2012.  South Korea is expected to purchase thirty-six Apaches in October 2012.

This move comes in the wake of the North’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.  It seems that South Korea is making sure that Baengnyeong Island, located to the west of Yeonpyeong, has some teeth in case the North decides to push its luck again.