Shen Dingli’s recent Foreign Policy article makes a common criticism against recent U.S. policy toward Syria and Crimea.

He writes that,

 “…the record of Obama’s administration, and that of his predecessor’s, is of security assurances backed up lately only by inaction.  The United States has failed to stop Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It failed to stand up to Russia’s adventurism in the formerly Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, or in Crimea in March of this year.  Granted, none of these places are treaty allies of the United States.  But if the United States won’t face Russia in Europe, will it really challenge China in the East and South China seas?”

This echoes arguments made by other critics of the Obama Administration.  If the U.S. doesn’t stand up to Syria and Russia, they ask, how can it hope to deter China?

Such critics fear that if Washington’s Asian allies believe it doesn’t possess the will to enforce its preferences in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, they will question America’s willingness to defend them and seek to either bandwagon with Beijing or make greater provisions for their own defence, further destabilising the Asia-Pacific region.

Such criticism, however, stems from a failure to appreciate that judicious strategy distinguishes between preferences and vital interests.

Washington, of course, would prefer a secular liberal democracy to emerge in Syria.  It would also prefer a liberal democratic Ukraine free from Moscow’s malign influence.  Neither of these outcomes, however, can be easily achieved, if at all.  More to the point, the U.S. does not have a vital interest – defined as those interests which affect one’s security and that a state will use force to defend – in the outcome of either conflict.

First, Syria.  Chastened by its misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington is not keen to get drawn into another Middle Eastern conflict.  Getting bogged down in another sectarian conflict in the Arab world would do little to promote U.S. security and would devour resources better devoted to supporting the Washington’s pivot to Asia.

As for Crimea, Washington has offered it no security assurances and is not treaty-bound to defend it.  Using force to do so would run the risk of a clash between U.S. and Russian forces.  The defence of Crimea or Ukraine, a weak, impoverished state on the periphery of Europe, is not worth risking a clash with a nuclear-armed Russia that has a greater stake in the outcome than Washington.

For those who argue that allowing Moscow to dissect Ukraine will encourage Russian revanchism, emboldening it to seek to regain territory it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed, a little perspective is required.

Its latest actions have weakened, not strengthened Russia.  It has estranged itself from Europe and its neighbours will now be more alert to any actions that suggest Moscow is looking to redraw its borders.  Should it seek to embark on such a course, it will likely result in a balancing coalition forming against it.

Should a European balancing coalition form against it, Russia would find itself in a weak strategic position.  Europe possesses a population five times greater than Russia and enjoys a GDP eight times larger than its eastern neighbour.  The U.S. could certainly act as an offshore balancer, but it need not man the front lines.  Contemporary Russia is not the Soviet Union; Washington should expect its European allies to do the heavy-lifting.

What, then, does this mean for Asia?  I believe that Asian leaders recognise these realities and privately applaud Washington’s decision to remain relatively aloof from the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine.  After all, it isn’t in their interests for Washington to dilute its strength by taking on new security commitments in the Middle East and Europe and it certainly isn’t in their interests for the U.S. to get bogged down in conflicts in these regions.

In conclusion, it is telling that only one Asian power would identify a benefit in U.S. involvement in Syria and Ukraine.  It’s the same power that benefited from Washington’s strategic distraction in the War on Terror and the ill-judged wars it fostered.  Beijing would be only too happy to see Washington’s strategic attention focused on Syria and Russia.  By declining to get involved in conflicts of marginal importance to its security, America is better able to marshal its resources for the purpose that will shape its security in the 21^st century, balancing China’s rise.