Tag Archives: Myanmar

What explains Myanmar’s volte face?

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Myanmar President Thein Sein

While the Arab Spring has caused more ink to be spilled in attempts to explain why supposedly stable regimes were in reality brittle and vulnerable, another authoritarian state has begun to tentatively open up to the outside world. Much to the surprise of analysts who thought that the 2010 Myanmar elections would prove to be a sham that merely airbrushed the junta’s continued rule, recent events have suggested that the regime may be serious about liberalising.

Under the Presidency of Thein Sein, a former military officer, the new ‘civilian’ government, though it is composed of former senior military officers, has passed a new law loosening the ban on protests, though this has yet to be tested. Would-be protestors are required to apply for permission at least five days in advance.

Meanwhile, in an apparent attempt to address Myanmar’s ethnic divisions, the government has been reported to have called a ceasefire with the Shan State Army South, an armed ethnic rebel group. Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s iconic pro-democracy activist, has also been released from house arrest and it seems that she will be permitted to return to politics.

Finally, the most obvious sign that the regime in Naypyitaw is liberalising somewhat is US Secretary of State Clinton’s recent visit. Allowing such a prominent figure to visit stands in marked contrast to Myanmar’s rejection of American aid in the wake of Hurrican Nargis.

The source of such a surprising turnaround is unclear. Some analysts have suggested that a rapprochement with the West could be motivated by a desire to avoid becoming too dependent upon China. However, while Naypyitaw has relied upon Beijing for arms and investment, particularly in the resource sector, it is also true that Thailand and India have proved to be more lucrative export markets. Myanmar is not the Chinese vassal state it is often portrayed to be.

Others, meanwhile, have suggested that some in the regime may have been repelled by the scale of the violence employed against protesting Buddhist monks in 2007. The military officers who formed the junta and who are now comfortably ensconced in the current civilian government have not, however, done anything in the past to suggest that they are squeamish about using force to perpetuate their rule, so this seems an unlikely motivation.

It seems more likely that events in the Middle East during the Arab Spring have concentrated the minds of those at the head of government. It seems plausible that they hope to tread a fine line between liberalising enough to give the average citizen a stake in their society and losing control, a path that Beijing is also attempting to stick to.

They may also hope to copy Pyongyang’s playbook: as a point of convergence between the great powers in the region, Naypyitaw may hope to play off the Chinese, Indians and, to a lesser extent, the Americans, against each other to its own advantage.

In short, the reasons behind Myanmar’s surprising direction are unclear. Thein Sein may prove to be Myanmar’s Gorbachev, though it should be noted that Gorbachev had no desire to break up the USSR, he simply wishes to modernise it. It seems safe to assume that those in government wish to preserve their leadership and that this desire will influence future decision-making.

Ethnic Fighting Breaks Out in Myanmar

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Fighting has broken out between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and government forces in northern Myanmar near the Chinese border.  Myanmar state media is reporting that the government decided to act after the KIA attacked first and refused to withdraw form an area near a hydropower plant.

The fighting is centred in Kachin State, not far from where the Datang Corporation, a Chinese state owned enterprise (SOE), is building a hydroelectric plant on the Taping river.  It has been claimed by the corporation that 90% of the energy produced will go to Chinese companies across the border.

While Myanmar’s state media is reporting that the government’s intentions are “to protect its members and an important hydropower project of the nation”, this outbreak of fighting breaks a 1994 ceasefire with the KIA which allowed it to keep its  arms.  Analysts have claimed that the government in Naypyidaw is determined to assert its authority over the rebellious state whose militias have battled the regime for decades and have lately resisted pressure to incorporate their fighters into a state-run border security force.

It is also likely that Naypyidaw is under pressure from China, its major ally, to secure the region and protect its investment.  When the fighting broke out, approximately 200 Chinese engineers and other workers were swiftly repatriated across the border.

China has extensive and increasing hydropower investments in Myanmar and they are an increasing source of instability.  For the government, they are a welcome source of revenue.  The Burma River Network, for example, has claimed that China’s investments in Kachin State is worth $3.6bn and will result in annual power sales of $500m.

For those forced to live in their shadow, however, they create resentment as they see little of the revenue created, are displaced to make way for projects and have to live with the environmental consequences.  In addition to the fighting in Kachin State, both Shan State and Karenni State have seen recent fighting, prompted by dam construction, reports the Burma Rivers Network.

The Irrawaddy, an independent Burmese newspaper based in Thailand, has reported that representatives from the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the political wing of the Kachin independence movement, met with representatives of the Kachin Consultative Committee, a group of Kachin loyal to the central government, to discuss the possibility of a ceasefire on Friday 17th June.

The KCC representatives stated that the government wishes to call a ceasefire.  This assertion was rejected by the KIO because, it claimed, of the delegates’ inability to produce any form of evidence to confirm the intentions of the government.

With the KIO claiming that as many as 10,000 Kachins are now fleeing from the fighting, including some 200 who have crossed the border into China, no immediate prospect of a ceasefire, and a central government that remains unsympathetic to the claims of various ethnic groups for greater autonomy, far less independence, the prospects for reconciliation seem slight.