It is hard to over-state the importance of Saturday’s presidential election in Taiwan. Three candidates – Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen and James Soong – competed for the right to lead a country whose small population of 23 million people belies its geopolitical importance.
The incumbent president, Ma Ying-jeou, has defeated his DPP rival, Tsai Ing-wen, who has resigned in the wake of defeat. James Soong, a former senior member of the KMT who some though might siphon votes from Ma failed to make an impact, polling low single figures.
What, then, are the implications of Ma’s second term for Taiwan and the region?
For Taiwan, it gives Ma a mandate to continue to improve links with China. Nevertheless, how Ma tackles Taiwan’s stuttering economy will surely play a large role in how his second term is assessed. He will hope that increased tourism from the mainland and deals signed with Beijing to lower tariffs on Taiwanese goods will stimulateTaipei’s economy.
He will also seek a peace treaty with the mainland and the removal of PLA missiles currently targeting the island.
Washington, too, will be quietly happy with the result. While the DPP had moderated its pro-independence message, the U.S.is much more comfortable with Ma’s approach which has emphasised building ties with the mainland under his Three Nos policy – no declaration of independence, no unification, and no use of force to resolve the differences across the Straits.
Beijing will also see this result as a vindication of its policy toward Ma’s Taiwan. To encourage engagement, China has signed trade deals advantageous to Taiwan, has allowed it to commence participation in several international bodies and has refrained from encouraging the few states that still recognise Taiwan diplomatically to switch their recognition to Beijing.
Had Ma been defeated, this would probably have caused Beijing to recalculate its approach. We can now look forward to China’s forthcoming leadership change with interest. It will be fascinating to see if the CCP continues with its current policy, which has been more fruitful than its past belligerence, or if it will become frustrated at the continued absence of any inclination among Taiwanese to return to the mainland.
Indeed, many Taiwanese feel that opening to China will threaten their jobs while only benefitting large Taiwanese businesses. There are also concerns about becoming too dependent on the mainland. Security typically trumps economics, so it remains likely that Taiwanese will remain dismissive of political unification. Taiwanese voters are aware that a keenly fought election such as this one would be impossible under any ‘one country, many systems’ arrangement.
One of the most interesting themes of this poll has in fact been mainland interest in the election. While the CCP limited coverage of the campaign and there have even been reports that mainland tour groups in Taiwan have been instructed to remain indoors on polling day, lest they be exposed to the idea that democracy may not be entirely unsuitable for Chinese, Sina Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter, has been full of comments wistfully expressing hopes that China might also one day hold elections. Taiwan may not be ready to unify with China; it may never do so, but if nothing else it does act as a rebuttal to those who argue that Chinese culture is inimical to democracy.
Asia Pacific Briefing 