The Strategist, a blog run by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute, posted an article concerning Australia’s future submarine today that arrived at some interesting conclusions.
In the post, the author, Nic Stuart, questions the necessity of a submarine capability, particularly in light of Canberra’s present budgetary difficulties. He suggests that new robotic technologies could perform a similar function to the proposed submarines, that the money lavished on the submarines could be better spent on other ways to achieve Australia’s strategic objectives, and that there are better alternatives that ought to be explored.
While I think it’s valuable to question received wisdom, I find Stuart’s article unconvincing. To begin with, the notion that robotic technology could replace a submarine within a relatively short timeline seems fanciful to me. If the cost of acquiring a new submarine is expensive, developing a robotic alternative that could approach or match the capabilities of a traditional submarine would, I wager, be prohibitive and most likely beyond Australia’s ability if the travails experienced with the Collins class is any indication.
As for the matter of money, the sinew of strategy, there is no doubt that a new submarine will represent a large investment. This, however, does not mean that it will not be a wise investment. The first priority of the ADF is to defend the Australian continent. While any conventional threat to Australia currently seems unlikely, it must be prepared for. In addition, given the rapid shifts in relative power taking place in the Asia Pacific, only a fool would be willing to bet that Australia would not have cause to rue the absence of a submarine capability over the next thirty years or so.
Given Australia’s vast maritime approaches, I consider a submarine capability to be essential. Even the presence of a limited number of submarines would severely complicate the planning of any opponent. If any naval procurement program should be revisited it should be the construction of the Navy’s news air warfare destroyers. They may make for fine photo opportunities for politicians, but that does not change the fact that they are large floating targets, easily overwhelmed by swarming tactics.
Stuart concludes that there are better ways to achieve Australia’s strategic objectives. Unfortunately, however, he does not outline what they are. While I concur that Australia’s limited defence budget could be spent more effectively, allowing its submarine capability to wither is not the answer.
Asia Pacific Briefing 
Thanks for your post. As you correctly suggest, the idea of the post was “to question received wisdom”. It was intended to be provocative, because quite obviously we’re getting a sub anyway. But it’s important to go back to the original question – what do we want a submarine for? – so that we can refine what specific capabilities we require it for in the first place.
I agree swapping the AWD’s for subs would be (far) better. The trouble is we’ve got them anyway. I didn’t outline alternatives partly because of lack of space, but also because the aim was simply to get us to think. Are there any alternatives? If not it may help to refine why we want submarines which would help us to decide if we need long-range, big ones or more smaller ones. And finally, as regards the ‘better alternatives’ I agree I can’t yet envisage exactly what these may be. But I expect by 2020 I might have some very concrete ideas. Given the lead time for developing the submarines I believe looking ahead is vital.
Regards,
Nic
Thanks for your response, Nic, and please excuse my tardy reply. I agree that it’s always useful to question first principles, but as I argued in my post, I believe that submarines remain vital to Australia due, primarily, to their ability to severely complicate any attempt to project force against Australia. I can’t think of anything else that could perform this function as effectively as a submarine force.
As you say, Australia’s acquisition of new submarines is a foregone conclusion; the only question is what kind of sub we will get – nuclear or conventional, foreign or domestic. I can see the merits of both nuclear and conventional and I am, for the moment, sitting on the fence on this issue.
I firmly believe, however, that the government should look at acquiring an off-the-shelf model. The Collins experience illustrated how difficult – not to mention expensive – it is to design a modern sub from scratch. While Defence remains underfunded, I think it’s incumbent on the government to spend available funds as efficiently as possible, and that means buying a tried and tested foreign model. Unfortunately, if predictably, it looks like money will be wasted on an indigenous sub.
I agree that looking ahead is important given the lead time required for developing submarines and that drones will increasingly assume warfighting roles, but – and this may be a lack of imagination on my part – I can’t envisage a game-changer that will render subs obsolete. Time will tell, I guess.