Author Archives: Asia Pacific Briefing

China, Music and Soft Power

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Chinese instruments

The People’s Daily has recently reported that Beijing officials intend to create a China Music Village in the city’s Pinggu District.  Some estimates suggest that the project will encompass 10 square kilometres, take 10 years to construct, and cost over US$2.3 billion.  The project will include the construction of an industrial base dedicated to the manufacture of musical instruments, studio facilities, a commercial centre, an arena, music schools and hotels.

This project is illustrative of China’s efforts to develop soft power through promoting its culture.  It is ultimately self-defeating.  The creation of soft power cannot be led from the top, constructed and exported like an industrial product.  It’s organic, an almost inadvertent side-product of a society’s values and how it conducts itself.  If people consider this attractive, it endows its society of origin with soft power.

Compare the contrived, top-down Chinese approach with, say, the U.S.  Despite Beijing’s focus on increasing China’s cultural attractiveness and soft power, it has yet to develop anything as attractive as Levi’s jeans, rock and roll or the iPod, all cultural products that have nothing to do with U.S. government policies.  It seems unlikely that a government bureaucracy could marshal such creativity.

Indeed, the more contrived China’s approach to soft power seems, the less attractive it is.  Consider, for example, the 2008 Olympics.  Intended to be China’s ‘coming out’ party, announcing its arrival as a truly powerful nation, it was dogged with stories of black jails, inadequate compensation for those whose property was destroyed in order to construct the infrastructure required for the games, and the Sanlu tainted milk cover-up.  In comparison, the news that the little girl who performed Ode to the Motherland at the opening ceremony was replaced with a cuter child who mimed her performance was comical.

In short, the CCP’s insistence on crafting an official narrative rather than embracing the multitude of stories that reflect different facets of China has obstructed the development of Chinese soft power.  The more it tries to control the narrative, the less appealing, even sinister, its efforts seem.

The success of K-Pop in general, and PSY’s Gangnam Style in particular, has prompted debate in China about whether it could ever create such a phenomenon.  Given that Chinese artists still face constraints, and the improbability of a Chinese government department ever encouraging something so ridiculous and satirical, it seems unlikely that the Chinese music industry will enjoy a similar cross-over hit in the near future.

Some thoughts on Asian literacy

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I haven’t finished reading the Australian Government’s Australia in the Asian Century White Paper yet, and I may blog on additional aspects of it in the coming days, but one thing that particularly strikes me  is the focus on the importance of learning Asian languages.

I don’t dispute that learning a foreign language is a laudable goal.  It opens up new worlds of literature, allows one the opportunity to converse and share ideas with people from another country, and affords an insight into the way users of that language think.  Learning another language is enjoyable (if, on occasion, frustrating) and gives one a real sense of achievement.

In the context of the debate surrounding Australia’s role in the Asian century, however, I’m not so sure that familiarity with an Asian language is essential.  It’s certainly desirable, but I believe that ensuring Australian school children are reasonably familiar with Asian history is much more important.

I enjoyed learning languages in school (French and Italian), but due to competing interests was unable to devote the necessary time required to become fluent.  I think the same will be true for the majority of Australian school children.  Only a relative few will pursue language study long enough to become fluent in, say, Mandarin.

In contrast, even if students choose not to history beyond their school years, being exposed to Asian history will give them some sort of framework they can use to interpret the decisions and policies of neighbouring countries.  Without a knowledge of Chinese history, for example, it’s difficult to understand the reasons behind Beijing’s recent actions surrounding the Senkaku islands.

Much of the debate surrounding Australia’s place in Asia in recent years has focused on the idea of increasing the ‘Asia literacy’ of its citizens.  Learning an Asian language is too intimidating for many people, but exposing school children to the history of the region seems to me the best way to increase ‘Asia literacy’ and encourage children to study the language of the country they are most interested in.

Lunch with Singapore’s PM

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Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore

On Friday 12 October, I had the privilege of attending an Asia Society lunch hosted by Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the Shangri La Hotel in Sydney. (Sometimes I really suffer for this blog)

In his remarks, the Prime Minister hailed the warm and increasing ties between his country and Australia.  He also highlighted the positive aspects of globalisation while noting that it has impacted negatively on job security and created increasing income gaps.

Nevertheless, the Premier was generally positive about Asia’s trajectory which is inextricably linked to China’s continued re-emergence on the world stage.  While the Premier stated that he believes a successful China will be positive for both the region and the world, he did acknowledge that managing the strategic consequences of China’s rise represents a major challenge for the international system.

The existing order does not have the luxury of slowly adapting to this changing order; it is taking place swiftly and, argued Lee, it will demand restraint and wisdom from the major powers in the region, particularly Washington.

Appealing to his audience, the Prime Minister, echoing the calls of such strategists as Hugh White, called upon Australia – an enthusiastic ally of the U.S. and a key Chinese trading partner – to contribute toward a peaceful shift in Asia’s strategic environment.

Despite these positive words, Singapore remains concerned about China’s rise.  It has agreed to host the U.S. Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships, while in his address the Premier acknowledged that ASEAN integration remains a work in progress, demanding patience and political will, in a seemingly oblique reference to Cambodia’s recent obstruction, at Beijing’s behest, of an ASEAN joint communiqué on the South China Sea.

Whatever the future holds, it is, as Mr. Lee stated, increasingly difficult for governments to look 10 or 20 years into the future, but Singapore seems reasonably well placed to take advantage of the continuing shift of economic weight from West to East.

Where in the world is Xi Jinping?

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Xi Jinping has not been seen in public for over one week

China is currently buzzing with rumours about the status of Xi Jinping, China’s president-to-be.  Xi has been missing from the public eye for over one week and has missed scheduled meetings with figures such as Hillary Clinton and Singapore’s Lee Hsien Loong.

In the absence of official confirmation of his status, the China internet has lit up with conspiracy theories and conjecture.  Various explanations have been offered by netizens – some have claimed he has injured himself swimming, others have suggested that he may have suffered a heart-attack, while more imaginative contributors have pondered whether he may have been the victim of a car crash engineered by conspirators sympathetic to Bo Xilai, the ousted Chongqing Party Secretary.

While it remains unclear what fate has befallen Xi – one assumes and hopes that he is merely under the weather – the response to his unexplained disappearance reveals a number of things about modern China.

The first and most obvious is that ordinary Chinese are able to follow the politics of their country more closely than in the past.  While the authorities have tried to block web searches using Xi’s name, Chinese internet users have easily circumvented such attempts by using terms such as Crown Prince to refer to their future leader.

The CCP’s response is also revealing.  Its instinct has been to clam up and refrain from revealing the reason for Xi’s sudden disappearance.  Given that I assume he has not been purged and is instead recuperating from some kind of injury or illness, this illustrates that for all the Party seeks to portray itself as capable of modern governance, it remains, at heart, the suspicious, paranoid organisation it has been since it formed.  Its early days as an underground, secretive organisation influence its instincts today, even after 60 years of continuous rule.

The response of Chinese netizens is also illustrative of how quickly ordinary Chinese embrace rumours.  This can readily be explained by the lack of transparent governance in China.  Had a government spokesperson simply made a statement to the effect that Xi is unwell but expects to return to public life soon, the situation would not have exploded into rumour and innuendo.  Given the government response to the SARS outbreak, Sanlu milk scandal, and even reports about pollution levels, however, ordinary citizens simply assume that it is being economical with the truth.

I expect Xi to surface fairly soon, but the government response to his absence has placed further pressure on the leadership transition later this year.  Whatever has happened to Xi, it seems safe to assume that this will not be the last incident to throw the Politburo into a spin before the transition takes place.

Hong Kong rejects patriotic education before voting

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Hong Kong activists have succeeded in blocking moves to establish mandatory patriotic education classes in the island’s schools.  Many Hong Kong citizens feared that their children would be exposed to what they consider Chinese Communist Party propaganda.  While the classes can still be taught, they will now be optional, with schools free to decide whether to hold them and parents free to withdraw their children should they wish.

The people of Hong Kong had legitimate concerns.  Chinese high school textbooks describe the Great Leap Forward, which led to a famine responsible for the deaths of tens of millions, as merely a time of “serious economic difficulties”, while the proposed patriotic curriculum apparently portrayed the CCP as progressive and unifying in contrast to the “divisive” and “unhealthy” democratic system favoured by most Hong Kong citizens.  What is particularly interesting is how this may impact on the Hong Kong elections held today (Sunday 9 September).

In recent times Hong Kong has seen an increase in anti-mainland sentiments.  Citizens of the semi-autonomous island have become increasingly concerned by the rising number of visitors from the mainland, the strain placed on the medical system by birth tourists seeking to procure a Hong Kong passport for their child, and the perceived lack of manners associated with the nouveau riche mainlanders.

Today’s election is fascinating because 40 of the 70 available seats in the island’s legislative council will be directly elected.  For plans for universal suffrage to be fulfilled in 2017, the support of the legislative council will be essential.  Pro-democracy candidates are expected to do well.

One wonders why the CCP felt such a curriculum was necessary.  It seems self-defeating.  Under the One Country, Two Systems model, Hong Kong enjoys considerable autonomy.  Compared with the mainland, its citizens are particularly well educated and cosmopolitan, enjoying access to greater freedom of speech and much lighter censorship than their brethren in China.  Such a ham-fisted effort to promote clumsy propaganda was always going to sit badly with Hong Kong citizens.

Such poor decision-making will also play badly in Taiwan.  Beijing has invested in greater ties with Taipei. It has suggested that should Taiwan return to the mainland, the One Country, Two Systems approach could be used to allow Taipei to preserve considerable autonomy.  Such clumsy attempts to promote the CCP’s historical narrative will only strengthen the opinion of those Taiwanese who wish to preserve the status quo.

China, the world’s largest Christian country?

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I recently read this Foreign Policy article about religion in China.  I encourage you to read it as it is an interesting article about the Chinese Communist Party’s burgeoning interest in harnessing the power of religion to serve its own political ends.  While the process of rehabilitating Confucius has been underway for some time, the article focuses on Christianity.

The benefit to the CCP of bringing Christianity into the mainstream is evident: it would encourage believers to be more open about their faith, giving the Party a more accurate picture of their numbers.  If it can continue to exert control upon religion as it seeks to do by, for example, insisting upon its right to appoint Catholic bishops in the face of fierce opposition from the Vatican, it may be able to channel religion in a direction which serves its desired ends.

Having recently spent some time reading Taiwanese and South Korean history, however, I have been struck by the key role that Christians played in these states’ respective democratic transitions.  Might not the same scenario develop in China?  Will believers be content to have the limits of their religious conscience circumscribed or will a kind of Christianity with Chinese characteristics continue to evolve?  Perhaps the treatment of Falun Gong members will dissuade Christians from organising and pushing against limits imposed upon them by the authorities.

As with so many aspects of modern China, no one knows how religiosity will evolve in the Middle Kingdom.  While communist policy makers will doubtless place an emphasis on rendering unto the CCP the things which are the CCP’s, they will also be aware of the later impact of Christianity upon the Roman Empire.  Some estimates suggest that up to 10% of Chinese are Christians.  Might Christianity one day be adopted as a state religion?  This may seem fanciful, but Romans may have thought the same of the Empire before Constantine and Theodosius.

What its veto says about China

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China’s veto of a UN resolution condemning Syria’s crackdown on anti-government protestors has been widely criticised in the Western press, echoing the frank appraisals of such politicians as Hillary Clinton and the French Defence Minister, Gerard Longuet.

What the veto says about China, however, has received considerably less coverage.  Though it typically chooses to abstain when it holds reservations or disagrees with the subject of a vote, this time Beijing elected to actively sink the proposal to condemn the Assad regime’s behaviour.

China often declares its opposition to any attempt to impinge upon the sovereignty of other countries, fearing that one day the West may shift its attention to Chinese policies in Tibet and Xinjiang.  In the wake of the ousting of Libya’s Gaddafi, it was also concerned about the consequences of allowing a resolution condemning another Arab leader to pass. Beijing abstained when faced with a resolution to establish a no fly zone over Libya and then looked on appalled as NATO, from China’s perspective, not only overstepped its mandate, but hurdled it.

The decision to veto the Syrian resolution, however, seems to have been motivated by more than such sentiments.  Recent years have seen China adopt a more assertive approach to territorial claims in the South China Sea, offer blunt criticism of the West’s economic profligacy and pursue attempts to increase its own soft power.

Such behaviour is indicative of China’s growing confidence.  Though Beijing seems to have concluded that it overplayed its hand during the height of the Global Financial Crisis and its recent behaviour has been comparatively restrained, it is nevertheless apparent that China is much less willing to keep its head down and defer to the West.  It seems likely that as its power grows relative to that of the US, this trend will continue to develop.  This veto was a rare flexing of China’s diplomatic muscle in the UN Security Council; it is also likely to become more common.

India Chooses the Rafale

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India has finally chosen th Dassault Rafale

 

The Dassault Rafale has emerged asIndia’s preferred fighter, beating competition from the Eurofighter Typhoon.  It has also seen off rivals such as the U.S. F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG 35, and Swedish Saab Gripen.

Dassault will now enter final negotiations aimed at concluding a deal that will see India purchase 126 Rafales, with the option of a further 63 jets.  It should be noted, however, that Dassault has fallen at the final hurdle before, failing to seal deals with nations such as Morocco, Brazil and the UAE.

That said, should the deal be finalised, it will see Dassault win a major contract, with estimates of its value ranging from $11 to $20 billion.  This would be extremely welcome news for Dassault which has failed to win an export market for its aircraft.  Some figures in the French Defence Ministry have even questioned the wisdom of continuing government support for the firm in the absence of foreign interest in the Rafale.

From the Indian perspective, this deal makes a lot of sense.  The Indian Air Force (IAF) has a long history of flying French aircraft so this purchase represents a degree of continuity.  Indeed, India is also working with France to improve its naval capabilities in the shape of the Franco-Spanish Scorpène submarine.

The Rafale comes in multiple variants.  The Rafale M is designed to operate from aircraft carriers and will be of particular interest to an Indian Navy aiming to develop a carrier warfare capability.  In addition to this variant, the French operate a two-seat Rafale B and single-seat Rafale C, while the aircraft can also perform as a tactical nuclear bomber.  This may appeal to a country which considers itself threatened by Pakistani and Chinese nuclear weapons.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of India’s decision, however, is how swiftly it discarded the American option.  Both the F-16 and F-18 failed to win India’s approval.  Given Washington’s support of New Delhi’s great power ambitions and the combat-tested pedigree of these aircraft, India’s decision is somewhat surprising and will not lend itself to interoperability with U.S. forces should defence co-operation between the two countries grow.  While India tested all contenders in a comprehensive evaluation process, it seems plausible that its decision was informed by its traditional desire to emphasise its strategic independence, an inclination also shared, incidentally, by Paris.

If such philosophical considerations played a role in India’s decision, it also seems likely that the prospect of benefiting from the transfer of French technology also played its part.  Though France will deliver the first 18 jets off the shelf, the remaining aircraft will be manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics.  As India is keen to improve its indigenous defence industry, such a technology transfer will have held a great appeal.

In short,India is set to buy a capable aircraft, while France will be keen to consolidate its foothold in the world’s largest emerging defence market.  The decision to purchase the Rafale also emphasises that India remains determined to follow its own course.  America’s aim of supporting the rise of India as a great power to build its ability to serve as a provider of security in the Indian Ocean will be slower and more difficult than Washington would like.

 

An increased U.S. presence in the Philippines is on the cards

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A proposed deal with the Philippes may see the U.S. Navy operating ships from that country

The Washington Post has reported that U.S. and Filipino officials are in the early stages of negotiating a deal that would see an expansion of Washington’s military presence in the Philippines.

Though the U.S. has stationed a small number of special forces troops in the country to assist Manila’s efforts to combat Islamist rebels, this deal, if successfully concluded, could allow the U.S. Navy to operate ships from the Philippines and rotate troops through bases there in addition to staging joint exercises.  Washington used to operate from a large base in the Philippines’ Subic Bay but left in 1992 when Manila decided not to renew the basing agreement.

This proposed new arrangement reflects increasing Filipino concern regarding assertive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea (which Manila has taken to naming the West Philippine Sea in an effort to bolster its own territorial claims).  It would also dovetail with the Obama administration’s pivot toward the Asia Pacific which has seen, for example, moves to station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and a deal with Australia increasing military co-operation between the U.S. military and Australian Defence Force.

A deal would serve U.S. efforts to disperse its forces in the Asia Pacific theatre, making them less vulnerable to attack in the early stages of any conflict with China.  An increased U.S. Navy presence in South East Asia would be key to any strategy of choking Chinese supply routes through the South China Sea and Straits of Malacca.

If these early negotiations are successful, further meetings will be held in March.  As such an arrangement would be in the stated interests of both states, it seems likely that some kind of agreement will be reached.

Indonesia’s Military Development

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While governments around the world are tightening their belts in response to ongoing economic volatility, other countries, particularly in Asia, continue to modernise their military forces.  The modernisation process in China has created a cottage industry of analysts devoted to assessing the efficacy of PLA anti-ship missiles, military aircraft development and PLAN moves to develop a blue water naval capability.

China, however, is not the only Asian nation which is currently developing its armed forces.  Indonesia, too, has announced both an increase in military spending and specific procurement objectives.

Indonesia is looking at obtaining some sophisticated equipment.  It is negotiations with the Netherlands to purchase Leopard tanks, of which the Dutch government has offered 150.  Jakarta is also purchasing six Su-30 Sukhoi fighters and looking to upgrade its F-16 fleet.  Perhaps its most ambitious purchase is its planned $1.1 billion acquisition of three diesel electric submarines from South Korea.

Such modernisation should, however, be put in context.  Even with recent budget increases, Indonesia’s budget has barely edged above 1% of GDP.  Indeed, should the Yudyohono administration’s goal of spending 1.5% of GDP on its military by 2015 be achieved, this will remain a slight slice of the national pie compared to that spent by its regional neighbours such as China, Singapore and Australia.

Indonesia, like many other Asian countries, is now investing in sophisticated platforms common in Western military inventories.  As Asia becomes richer, it is natural that it invests greater funds in military procurement.  This reflects the regional trend of moving from fielding primarily land-based forces to developing maritime and aerial capabilities.  In addition, while new toys such as submarines, fighter jets and tanks may grab headlines, a large proportion of military spending increases will be devoted to improved wages for servicemen and maintaining existing equipment.

An improved Indonesian military will also be more capable of contributing to public goods such as anti-piracy missions and drug interdiction.  That said, Indonesian military modernisation will raise some concerns in Canberra.  While the Australian-Indonesian relationship has improved remarkably over the last decade, Australia has often looked toward Indonesia as a potential threat.  Indonesia’s democratic transition has done a great deal to mitigate such suspicion, but while Jakarta remains an unconsolidated democracy, Canberra will continue to hedge its bets.

Canberra’s main focus is on protecting its maritime approaches.  As Indonesia develops its navy and airforce, its ability to project force toward Australia will increase and this will pose a challenge to the dominance of the ADF.  As a key ADF aim is to remain the most technologically sophisticated military in its neighbourhood, it will be interesting to see how Canberra reacts.

In many ways, however, both countries are natural defence partners.  Australia’s small army and sophisticated maritime and aerial forces complement Indonesia’s large army and rudimentary navy and air force.  In the event of any challenge from North Asia, the ADF could offer important support to a threatened Jakarta, while Australian analysts have argued that the Indonesian archipelago can be used as a shield against any attack on its northern approaches.

In conclusion, Jakarta’s recent moves to invest greater resources in its military should not be seen as a threat.  Rather, it promises to increase security in its neighbourhood.  Australia should continue to assist Indonesia’s economic and political development to ensure that Jakarta remains a force for stability in Southeast Asia.