Tag Archives: China

Why America should welcome China’s attempt to spy on RIMPAC

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RIMPAC 2014

 

It has recently been reported that China has sent a surveillance vessel to observe the RIMPAC exercise in which Beijing is participating for the first time.

Little open source information is available about the Dongdiao-class (Type 815) intelligence collection/missile range instrumentation ship, but Jane’s has viewed material that suggests the class possesses “high-technology radio signal gathering and processing equipment”.  As part of its formal presence, the PLA-N has sent a missile destroyer, a missile frigate, a supply ship and the Peace Ark hospital ship.

While some have called on China to be banned from participating in future RIMPAC exercises, Washington should welcome Beijing’s clumsy move.  By acknowledging China’s right to conduct electronic surveillance from within Hawaii’s exclusive economic zone and by not attempting to impede it, Washington is supporting a global norm that China has sought to dispute, most notably illustrated by the 2009 incident in which Chinese vessels harassed the USNS Impeccable in international waters.

By not impeding the PLA-N’s surveillance ship, America is making it more difficult for Beijing to obstruct vessels in waters off the Chinese coast.  This will not only strengthen the U.S. position,  but will benefit regional states in Asia which have experienced harassment by Chinese vessels.

Preferences and Vital Interests

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Shen Dingli’s recent Foreign Policy article makes a common criticism against recent U.S. policy toward Syria and Crimea.

He writes that,

 “…the record of Obama’s administration, and that of his predecessor’s, is of security assurances backed up lately only by inaction.  The United States has failed to stop Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It failed to stand up to Russia’s adventurism in the formerly Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, or in Crimea in March of this year.  Granted, none of these places are treaty allies of the United States.  But if the United States won’t face Russia in Europe, will it really challenge China in the East and South China seas?”

This echoes arguments made by other critics of the Obama Administration.  If the U.S. doesn’t stand up to Syria and Russia, they ask, how can it hope to deter China?

Such critics fear that if Washington’s Asian allies believe it doesn’t possess the will to enforce its preferences in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, they will question America’s willingness to defend them and seek to either bandwagon with Beijing or make greater provisions for their own defence, further destabilising the Asia-Pacific region.

Such criticism, however, stems from a failure to appreciate that judicious strategy distinguishes between preferences and vital interests.

Washington, of course, would prefer a secular liberal democracy to emerge in Syria.  It would also prefer a liberal democratic Ukraine free from Moscow’s malign influence.  Neither of these outcomes, however, can be easily achieved, if at all.  More to the point, the U.S. does not have a vital interest – defined as those interests which affect one’s security and that a state will use force to defend – in the outcome of either conflict.

First, Syria.  Chastened by its misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington is not keen to get drawn into another Middle Eastern conflict.  Getting bogged down in another sectarian conflict in the Arab world would do little to promote U.S. security and would devour resources better devoted to supporting the Washington’s pivot to Asia.

As for Crimea, Washington has offered it no security assurances and is not treaty-bound to defend it.  Using force to do so would run the risk of a clash between U.S. and Russian forces.  The defence of Crimea or Ukraine, a weak, impoverished state on the periphery of Europe, is not worth risking a clash with a nuclear-armed Russia that has a greater stake in the outcome than Washington.

For those who argue that allowing Moscow to dissect Ukraine will encourage Russian revanchism, emboldening it to seek to regain territory it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed, a little perspective is required.

Its latest actions have weakened, not strengthened Russia.  It has estranged itself from Europe and its neighbours will now be more alert to any actions that suggest Moscow is looking to redraw its borders.  Should it seek to embark on such a course, it will likely result in a balancing coalition forming against it.

Should a European balancing coalition form against it, Russia would find itself in a weak strategic position.  Europe possesses a population five times greater than Russia and enjoys a GDP eight times larger than its eastern neighbour.  The U.S. could certainly act as an offshore balancer, but it need not man the front lines.  Contemporary Russia is not the Soviet Union; Washington should expect its European allies to do the heavy-lifting.

What, then, does this mean for Asia?  I believe that Asian leaders recognise these realities and privately applaud Washington’s decision to remain relatively aloof from the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine.  After all, it isn’t in their interests for Washington to dilute its strength by taking on new security commitments in the Middle East and Europe and it certainly isn’t in their interests for the U.S. to get bogged down in conflicts in these regions.

In conclusion, it is telling that only one Asian power would identify a benefit in U.S. involvement in Syria and Ukraine.  It’s the same power that benefited from Washington’s strategic distraction in the War on Terror and the ill-judged wars it fostered.  Beijing would be only too happy to see Washington’s strategic attention focused on Syria and Russia.  By declining to get involved in conflicts of marginal importance to its security, America is better able to marshal its resources for the purpose that will shape its security in the 21st century, balancing China’s rise.

 

China, Music and Soft Power

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Chinese instruments

The People’s Daily has recently reported that Beijing officials intend to create a China Music Village in the city’s Pinggu District.  Some estimates suggest that the project will encompass 10 square kilometres, take 10 years to construct, and cost over US$2.3 billion.  The project will include the construction of an industrial base dedicated to the manufacture of musical instruments, studio facilities, a commercial centre, an arena, music schools and hotels.

This project is illustrative of China’s efforts to develop soft power through promoting its culture.  It is ultimately self-defeating.  The creation of soft power cannot be led from the top, constructed and exported like an industrial product.  It’s organic, an almost inadvertent side-product of a society’s values and how it conducts itself.  If people consider this attractive, it endows its society of origin with soft power.

Compare the contrived, top-down Chinese approach with, say, the U.S.  Despite Beijing’s focus on increasing China’s cultural attractiveness and soft power, it has yet to develop anything as attractive as Levi’s jeans, rock and roll or the iPod, all cultural products that have nothing to do with U.S. government policies.  It seems unlikely that a government bureaucracy could marshal such creativity.

Indeed, the more contrived China’s approach to soft power seems, the less attractive it is.  Consider, for example, the 2008 Olympics.  Intended to be China’s ‘coming out’ party, announcing its arrival as a truly powerful nation, it was dogged with stories of black jails, inadequate compensation for those whose property was destroyed in order to construct the infrastructure required for the games, and the Sanlu tainted milk cover-up.  In comparison, the news that the little girl who performed Ode to the Motherland at the opening ceremony was replaced with a cuter child who mimed her performance was comical.

In short, the CCP’s insistence on crafting an official narrative rather than embracing the multitude of stories that reflect different facets of China has obstructed the development of Chinese soft power.  The more it tries to control the narrative, the less appealing, even sinister, its efforts seem.

The success of K-Pop in general, and PSY’s Gangnam Style in particular, has prompted debate in China about whether it could ever create such a phenomenon.  Given that Chinese artists still face constraints, and the improbability of a Chinese government department ever encouraging something so ridiculous and satirical, it seems unlikely that the Chinese music industry will enjoy a similar cross-over hit in the near future.

Lunch with Singapore’s PM

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Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore

On Friday 12 October, I had the privilege of attending an Asia Society lunch hosted by Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the Shangri La Hotel in Sydney. (Sometimes I really suffer for this blog)

In his remarks, the Prime Minister hailed the warm and increasing ties between his country and Australia.  He also highlighted the positive aspects of globalisation while noting that it has impacted negatively on job security and created increasing income gaps.

Nevertheless, the Premier was generally positive about Asia’s trajectory which is inextricably linked to China’s continued re-emergence on the world stage.  While the Premier stated that he believes a successful China will be positive for both the region and the world, he did acknowledge that managing the strategic consequences of China’s rise represents a major challenge for the international system.

The existing order does not have the luxury of slowly adapting to this changing order; it is taking place swiftly and, argued Lee, it will demand restraint and wisdom from the major powers in the region, particularly Washington.

Appealing to his audience, the Prime Minister, echoing the calls of such strategists as Hugh White, called upon Australia – an enthusiastic ally of the U.S. and a key Chinese trading partner – to contribute toward a peaceful shift in Asia’s strategic environment.

Despite these positive words, Singapore remains concerned about China’s rise.  It has agreed to host the U.S. Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships, while in his address the Premier acknowledged that ASEAN integration remains a work in progress, demanding patience and political will, in a seemingly oblique reference to Cambodia’s recent obstruction, at Beijing’s behest, of an ASEAN joint communiqué on the South China Sea.

Whatever the future holds, it is, as Mr. Lee stated, increasingly difficult for governments to look 10 or 20 years into the future, but Singapore seems reasonably well placed to take advantage of the continuing shift of economic weight from West to East.

Where in the world is Xi Jinping?

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Xi Jinping has not been seen in public for over one week

China is currently buzzing with rumours about the status of Xi Jinping, China’s president-to-be.  Xi has been missing from the public eye for over one week and has missed scheduled meetings with figures such as Hillary Clinton and Singapore’s Lee Hsien Loong.

In the absence of official confirmation of his status, the China internet has lit up with conspiracy theories and conjecture.  Various explanations have been offered by netizens – some have claimed he has injured himself swimming, others have suggested that he may have suffered a heart-attack, while more imaginative contributors have pondered whether he may have been the victim of a car crash engineered by conspirators sympathetic to Bo Xilai, the ousted Chongqing Party Secretary.

While it remains unclear what fate has befallen Xi – one assumes and hopes that he is merely under the weather – the response to his unexplained disappearance reveals a number of things about modern China.

The first and most obvious is that ordinary Chinese are able to follow the politics of their country more closely than in the past.  While the authorities have tried to block web searches using Xi’s name, Chinese internet users have easily circumvented such attempts by using terms such as Crown Prince to refer to their future leader.

The CCP’s response is also revealing.  Its instinct has been to clam up and refrain from revealing the reason for Xi’s sudden disappearance.  Given that I assume he has not been purged and is instead recuperating from some kind of injury or illness, this illustrates that for all the Party seeks to portray itself as capable of modern governance, it remains, at heart, the suspicious, paranoid organisation it has been since it formed.  Its early days as an underground, secretive organisation influence its instincts today, even after 60 years of continuous rule.

The response of Chinese netizens is also illustrative of how quickly ordinary Chinese embrace rumours.  This can readily be explained by the lack of transparent governance in China.  Had a government spokesperson simply made a statement to the effect that Xi is unwell but expects to return to public life soon, the situation would not have exploded into rumour and innuendo.  Given the government response to the SARS outbreak, Sanlu milk scandal, and even reports about pollution levels, however, ordinary citizens simply assume that it is being economical with the truth.

I expect Xi to surface fairly soon, but the government response to his absence has placed further pressure on the leadership transition later this year.  Whatever has happened to Xi, it seems safe to assume that this will not be the last incident to throw the Politburo into a spin before the transition takes place.

Hong Kong rejects patriotic education before voting

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Hong Kong activists have succeeded in blocking moves to establish mandatory patriotic education classes in the island’s schools.  Many Hong Kong citizens feared that their children would be exposed to what they consider Chinese Communist Party propaganda.  While the classes can still be taught, they will now be optional, with schools free to decide whether to hold them and parents free to withdraw their children should they wish.

The people of Hong Kong had legitimate concerns.  Chinese high school textbooks describe the Great Leap Forward, which led to a famine responsible for the deaths of tens of millions, as merely a time of “serious economic difficulties”, while the proposed patriotic curriculum apparently portrayed the CCP as progressive and unifying in contrast to the “divisive” and “unhealthy” democratic system favoured by most Hong Kong citizens.  What is particularly interesting is how this may impact on the Hong Kong elections held today (Sunday 9 September).

In recent times Hong Kong has seen an increase in anti-mainland sentiments.  Citizens of the semi-autonomous island have become increasingly concerned by the rising number of visitors from the mainland, the strain placed on the medical system by birth tourists seeking to procure a Hong Kong passport for their child, and the perceived lack of manners associated with the nouveau riche mainlanders.

Today’s election is fascinating because 40 of the 70 available seats in the island’s legislative council will be directly elected.  For plans for universal suffrage to be fulfilled in 2017, the support of the legislative council will be essential.  Pro-democracy candidates are expected to do well.

One wonders why the CCP felt such a curriculum was necessary.  It seems self-defeating.  Under the One Country, Two Systems model, Hong Kong enjoys considerable autonomy.  Compared with the mainland, its citizens are particularly well educated and cosmopolitan, enjoying access to greater freedom of speech and much lighter censorship than their brethren in China.  Such a ham-fisted effort to promote clumsy propaganda was always going to sit badly with Hong Kong citizens.

Such poor decision-making will also play badly in Taiwan.  Beijing has invested in greater ties with Taipei. It has suggested that should Taiwan return to the mainland, the One Country, Two Systems approach could be used to allow Taipei to preserve considerable autonomy.  Such clumsy attempts to promote the CCP’s historical narrative will only strengthen the opinion of those Taiwanese who wish to preserve the status quo.

China, the world’s largest Christian country?

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I recently read this Foreign Policy article about religion in China.  I encourage you to read it as it is an interesting article about the Chinese Communist Party’s burgeoning interest in harnessing the power of religion to serve its own political ends.  While the process of rehabilitating Confucius has been underway for some time, the article focuses on Christianity.

The benefit to the CCP of bringing Christianity into the mainstream is evident: it would encourage believers to be more open about their faith, giving the Party a more accurate picture of their numbers.  If it can continue to exert control upon religion as it seeks to do by, for example, insisting upon its right to appoint Catholic bishops in the face of fierce opposition from the Vatican, it may be able to channel religion in a direction which serves its desired ends.

Having recently spent some time reading Taiwanese and South Korean history, however, I have been struck by the key role that Christians played in these states’ respective democratic transitions.  Might not the same scenario develop in China?  Will believers be content to have the limits of their religious conscience circumscribed or will a kind of Christianity with Chinese characteristics continue to evolve?  Perhaps the treatment of Falun Gong members will dissuade Christians from organising and pushing against limits imposed upon them by the authorities.

As with so many aspects of modern China, no one knows how religiosity will evolve in the Middle Kingdom.  While communist policy makers will doubtless place an emphasis on rendering unto the CCP the things which are the CCP’s, they will also be aware of the later impact of Christianity upon the Roman Empire.  Some estimates suggest that up to 10% of Chinese are Christians.  Might Christianity one day be adopted as a state religion?  This may seem fanciful, but Romans may have thought the same of the Empire before Constantine and Theodosius.

What its veto says about China

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China’s veto of a UN resolution condemning Syria’s crackdown on anti-government protestors has been widely criticised in the Western press, echoing the frank appraisals of such politicians as Hillary Clinton and the French Defence Minister, Gerard Longuet.

What the veto says about China, however, has received considerably less coverage.  Though it typically chooses to abstain when it holds reservations or disagrees with the subject of a vote, this time Beijing elected to actively sink the proposal to condemn the Assad regime’s behaviour.

China often declares its opposition to any attempt to impinge upon the sovereignty of other countries, fearing that one day the West may shift its attention to Chinese policies in Tibet and Xinjiang.  In the wake of the ousting of Libya’s Gaddafi, it was also concerned about the consequences of allowing a resolution condemning another Arab leader to pass. Beijing abstained when faced with a resolution to establish a no fly zone over Libya and then looked on appalled as NATO, from China’s perspective, not only overstepped its mandate, but hurdled it.

The decision to veto the Syrian resolution, however, seems to have been motivated by more than such sentiments.  Recent years have seen China adopt a more assertive approach to territorial claims in the South China Sea, offer blunt criticism of the West’s economic profligacy and pursue attempts to increase its own soft power.

Such behaviour is indicative of China’s growing confidence.  Though Beijing seems to have concluded that it overplayed its hand during the height of the Global Financial Crisis and its recent behaviour has been comparatively restrained, it is nevertheless apparent that China is much less willing to keep its head down and defer to the West.  It seems likely that as its power grows relative to that of the US, this trend will continue to develop.  This veto was a rare flexing of China’s diplomatic muscle in the UN Security Council; it is also likely to become more common.

President Ma Wins Second Term

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It is hard to over-state the importance of Saturday’s presidential election in Taiwan.  Three candidates – Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen and James Soong – competed for the right to lead a country whose small population of 23 million people belies its geopolitical importance.

The incumbent president, Ma Ying-jeou, has defeated his DPP rival, Tsai Ing-wen, who has resigned in the wake of defeat.  James Soong, a former senior member of the KMT who some though might siphon votes from Ma failed to make an impact, polling low single figures.

What, then, are the implications of Ma’s second term for Taiwan and the region?

For Taiwan, it gives Ma a mandate to continue to improve links with China.  Nevertheless, how Ma tackles Taiwan’s stuttering economy will surely play a large role in how his second term is assessed. He will hope that increased tourism from the mainland and deals signed with Beijing to lower tariffs on Taiwanese goods will stimulateTaipei’s economy.

He will also seek a peace treaty with the mainland and the removal of PLA missiles currently targeting the island.

Washington, too, will be quietly happy with the result.  While the DPP had moderated its pro-independence message, the U.S.is much more comfortable with Ma’s approach which has emphasised building ties with the mainland under his Three Nos policy – no declaration of independence, no unification, and no use of force to resolve the differences across the Straits.

Beijing will also see this result as a vindication of its policy toward Ma’s Taiwan.  To encourage engagement, China has signed trade deals advantageous to Taiwan, has allowed it to commence participation in several international bodies and has refrained from encouraging the few states that still recognise Taiwan diplomatically to switch their recognition to Beijing.

Had Ma been defeated, this would probably have caused Beijing to recalculate its approach.  We can now look forward to China’s forthcoming leadership change with interest.  It will be fascinating to see if the CCP continues with its current policy, which has been more fruitful than its past belligerence, or if it will become frustrated at the continued absence of any inclination among Taiwanese to return to the mainland.

Indeed, many Taiwanese feel that opening to China will threaten their jobs while only benefitting large Taiwanese businesses.  There are also concerns about becoming too dependent on the mainland.  Security typically trumps economics, so it remains likely that Taiwanese will remain dismissive of political unification.  Taiwanese voters are aware that a keenly fought election such as this one would be impossible under any ‘one country, many systems’ arrangement.

One of the most interesting themes of this poll has in fact been mainland interest in the election.  While the CCP limited coverage of the campaign and there have even been reports that mainland tour groups in Taiwan have been instructed to remain indoors on polling day, lest they be exposed to the idea that democracy may not be entirely unsuitable for Chinese, Sina Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter, has been full of comments wistfully expressing hopes that China might also one day hold elections. Taiwan may not be ready to unify with China; it may never do so, but if nothing else it does act as a rebuttal to those who argue that Chinese culture is inimical to democracy.

Key Trends in 2012

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As we reflect on 2011, it is obvious that it was a year of geopolitical flux, reflected most clearly in the so-called Arab Spring. Asia, however, was also an exciting arena.

The US pivoted its focus from its wars in the Middle East to the increasing challenge posed by China to Washington’s primacy in the Asia Pacific, while December saw the death of Kim Jong Il in North Korea and the succession of his son, Kim Jong Un. Speaking of leadership changes, Vladimir Putin announced that he would seek to return to his former presidential office, while another newly appointed president in Myanmar, Thein Sein, to the surprise of commentators, appeared to open the door to cautious liberalisation.

What, then, can we expect to be the key trends in 2012? While predicting the future is, to paraphrase Hillary Clinton, a fool’s errand, here are a number of issues to keep an eye on in 2012.

1. Look for China to reign in its recent belligerence and return to the smarter diplomacy it pursued up until around 2008. Recent assertiveness has alienated its neighbours and driven them into the welcoming arms of Washington. A diplomatic approach that focuses on building economic links and reassuring neighbours that it does not seek to dominate will be more fruitful that making outrageous claims of sovereignty.

2. Events in Myanmar this year will be telling. Will Aung San Suu Kyi be permitted to compete in fair elections? If she wins, will the result be honoured? How the administration of Thein Sein reacts will indicate how serious the government is about liberalising. A genuine opposition in parliament would be a significant step forward.

3. The U.S. also faces an important year. Look for Romney to win the Republican nomination. After that, all bets are off. Nevertheless, regardless of whether Obama or Romney wins, it is clear that we are now at the end of the post 9/11 age. The U.S. will focus on Asia and strengthening its primacy vis-à-vis China after its costly misadventures in the Middle East.

4. North Korea will continue to occupy the minds of policy makers. As always with the DPRK, there are more questions than answers. Will Kim Jong Un be supported by those around him? Will he be deposed or will he secure his own position? Will Pyongyang continue the belligerent approach highlighted by the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, or will it surprise everyone by tackling internal reform as China did under Deng Xiaoping?

5. The 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 will see a major leadership turnover. Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Wu Bangguo are all expected to retire, opening the way for the Politburo and its Standing Committee to welcome a large number of new faces. How will these new leaders handle an ever more complex society and what kind of foreign policy will they pursue?

6. Will Indonesia continue to consolidate its democracy or will it falter? Corruption allegations will continue to dismay Indonesians and shape their opinion of politics, while politicians on all sides seem to lack an appetite for reforms that could help Indonesia achieve its considerable potential.

7. How will U.S. and European financial travails affect Asia? The region will also suffer an economic slowdown, but ‘suffer’ may be the wrong word; after all, Beijing’s latest Five Year Plan aims to slow growth. Nevertheless, for a country that continues to rely on exports, continued economic trouble in the West will be a cause for significant concern. As China slows, neighbours such as South Korea and Japan will also suffer. An increase in protectionist sentiment, particularly in the U.S., will lead to much complaining and anti-dumping suits between Washington and Beijing.

8. Expect the balancing of security and economics in the Asia Pacific to become ever more precarious. Most states rely upon the U.S. for their security, while depending upon China for their economic prosperity. Though security typically trumps economics, no one wants to have to pick a side.

9. India can expect further growth, albeit of a slower nature, while its politicians will continue to be cautious, except when pursuing private business interests. Significant and much needed reform is unlikely to be embraced. Growth remains fuelled by domestic demand. A focus on increasing exports would be a significant source of growth and is likely to be pursued. Kashmir will continue to be a problem, but relations with Pakistan may improve, albeit glacially.